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Article 6

Book Reviews
Tradition Counter Tradition: Love and the Form of Fiction by Joseph Allen
Boone. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. x + 408. $27.50.
In 1980, in "What Do Feminist Critics Want? Or A Postcard from the Volcano" (ADE Bulletin 66: Winter 1980, 16-24), Sandra Gilbert addressed the
chairmen of the Association of Departments of English, lamenting that men
were not reading feminist criticism. Instead, feminist critics are "left to speak
more and more to one another rather than to those of you 'out there' whose
minds we passionately wish to reach" (p. 21). But scarcely a year later, Claire
Pajaczkowska wrote in Screen (22:1 [1981]), "I am tired of men arguing
amongst themselves as to who is the most feminist, frustrated by an object
feminism becoming the stakes in a displaced rivalry between men because of
a refusal by men to examine the structure of the relations between themselves." In Tradition Counter Tradition, Joseph Allen Boone is passionately
engaged with feminist literary criticism, but he also examines the structure of
relations between men in texts ranging from medieval love literature to Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead. Boone writes as a male critic who
wishes "neither to elide my own gender nor to reduce the centrality of feminism to my critical practice" (p. 25). In addition to the now classic texts of
feminist literature and criticism, his critical practice is informed by Mikhail
Bakhtin's dialogic theory of the novel and by Peter Brooks' psychoanalytic
analysis of narrative desire. Boone examines love, sexuality, and marriage as
social ideologies which are perpetuated in narrative stru.ctures ranging from
pre-Richardsonian novels to the present. This topic is the focus of Part One,
"Tradition: Marital Ideology and Novelistic Form." In Part Two, he relates
the dismantling of the ideology of marriage to the formal innovations in
nineteenth and twentieth century British and American novels.
Boone begins with an historical overview of the transformations in the institution and ideology of marriage dating from the courtly love tradition in
the late eleventh century. From a discussion of the legacy of adultery on the
Continent, he moves to the synthesis of love and marriage in Renaissance
and Puritan England, and discusses the relationship between the rise of the
middle class, the (so-called) "rise" of the novel, and the bourgeois ideal of
companionate marriage in the eighteenth century. Throughout, he draws on
Althusser's definition of ideology as a system of representations that constitute the sphere of social relations into which each individual is fitted; he then
links textual representation to the constructions of gender in the novelistic
marriage tradition. While most literary historians tend to praise their particular epoch-whether Late Medieval, Renaissance, or the eighteenth centuryas bringing about the most revolutionary changes in sexual politicS, Boone
argues that short-run innovations must be measured against larger transhistorical formations. One of the considerable values of.Boone's study is that by
taking the long view, he exposes the fundamental conservatism of each epoch and of the novel as a genre, noting that "what is genuinely revolutionizing tends to get absorbed in the fabric of society, a process which the novel
mimes" (p. 33).
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Boone shows just how the novel mimes this process, noting that "the history of the English-language novel cannot really be separated from the history of the romantic wedlock ideal whose rise we have been tracing: the new
genre gained its formal coherence in part by becoming the repository of the
marital ethos increasingly cultivated among Protestant middle classes in England and America" (p. 65). He focuses on three paradigmatic plots: courtship, seduction, and wedlock, comparing Pamela and Pride and Prejudice in
terms of courtship; Clarissa and Tess of the D'Urbervilles in terms of seduction; and Fielding's Amelia and Howells's A Modern Instance in terms of wedlock. In each chapter, the pairs of texts selected for detailed analysis are supplemented by a discussion of less familiar works of the period; one is thus informed about many more novels than are featured in the Table of Contents. I
particularly liked the section on seduction, because without sentimentalizing
Victimized Womanhood, Boone stresses the voyeurism that makes the reader
complicit in the textual design of mastery and submission. Thus while novelists like Richardson and Hardy lament their heroines' fates, they preserve the
sexual values intrinsic to patriarchal order and participate in lithe ideological
indoctrination common to the novelistic marriage tradition" (p. 130).
The second part, on "Counter-tradition: Demonstrations in Form Breaking," is even more interesting than Part One, for here Boone discusses novels
whose formal innovations are a means of subverting the myth of the happy
marriage, induding Wuthering Heights, Daniel Deronda, The Golden Bowl, and
To the Lighthouse. These juxtapositions yield provocative and original insights
into Catherine Linton's desire and destruction, Daniel Deronda's destiny,
Maggie Verver's calculated manipulation of both adulterous spouses and narrative resolutions; and Virginia Woolf's modernist dismantling of the Victorian marriage ideal and the conventions of realism. Marriage in these novels is a battle, an interior emptiness, a psychological constriction, mirrored in
narrative experiments in "writing beyond the ending of the traditional loveplot" (p. 224). These texts, Boone argues, have the potential to be revolutionary, since by exposing the alienating effects of uneasy wedlock, they reshape
the dynamics of narrative desire. Revolutionary potential, however, is not the
same thing as revolution. Like Peter Brooks in Reading for the Plot: Design and
Intention in Narrative, Boone occasionally elides the difference. Again like
Brooks, Boone tends to avoid the more radical implications of Derridean
post-structuralism regarding being and identity, and of Lacanian psychoanalysis regarding desire and the linguistic construction of the subject. But
Boone's debt to Brooks does not prevent him from cogently critiquing Brooks
(as well as Terry Eagleton) for hypothesizing a male reader; the pattern of
narrative desire they evoke "follows a linear model of sexual excitation and
final discharge most often associated, in both psychological and physiological
terms, with men ... [thus1fostering the illusion that all pleasure (of reading
or of sex) is ejaculatory" (p. 72).
In his last two chapters, Boone breaks the boundaries of the marriage plot
altogether, devoting a chapter each to separatist communities of men and
communities of women. Focusing on the American quest narrative as a
counter-traditional genre, he examines the hidden sexual politics in Moby
Dick, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Billy Budd, and The Sea Wolf. But far
from lamenting the lost Eden of a world without women, Boone examines
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the brutalizing effects of male supremacy-on men. Thus in each of these
texts, a man is subjugated to an erotics of domination; he takes the place of
Woman as other, alien. In contrast, by escaping from a marriage-oriented culture, characters like Ishmael and Huck escape not from women, but from a
dominant sexual order which is the focus of the novelists' critique. Since Ishmael and Huck achieve a "transgressive sense of identity that ... is multiform, fluid, and affirming in its integrity ... the male bond presents a conceptual alternative to the gender inequality institutionalized by marriage in
heterosexual relationships" (p. 272). Ironically, Melville and Twain turn out
to be less conservative than Hemingway and Mailer, who each reinscribe the
taboo against homosexuality and capitulate to the male fantasy of a world
without women.
Boone concludes by comparing male counterplots to female counterplots
and communities of women in Millenium Hall, Cranford, The Country of the
Pointed Firs, and Herland. The emancipatory joy in these female communities, the counter-traditional plotting and structural innovations which so deviated from conventional love-plots may, Boone speculates, account for the
willful scholary neglect of these novels when they first appeared. He ends by
relating these early visions of feminist utopias to texts by Djuna Barnes, Gloria Naylor, and Pat Barker. These models make "the materiality of woman's
existence ... the material of the text itself" p. 329), thereby suggesting a new
novelistic paradigm of ecrilure feminine. Feminist criticism thus not only recognizes old paradigms, but actively participates in the creation of new ones.
This marks the end of the "novelistic marriage tradition and the sexual ideology embedded in it, when challenged by the transforming presence of the
counter-traditional text, be it the undermining dialogue _of uneasy wedlock,
the male quest into a world of alternate possibilities, or the sustaining fiction
of female community" (p. 330).
In contrast to such books as Rene Girard's Deceit, Desire, and the Novel or
Denis de Rougemont's Love in the Western World, Boone's study demonstrates
the enormous difference that feminist criticism makes when analyzing narratives of romantic love. Boone's lively and far-reaching book is a significant
contribution to novel studies, one that deftly combines literary history with
cultural critique, formal analyses with feminist politics. It is a persuasive
study of the relation of social ideology to narrative structure, and a provocative presentation of both the ideologically coercive and potentially subversive
strains in love and the form of fiction.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Linda Kauffman

Nostalgia and Sexual Difference: The Resistance to Contemporanj Feminism by
Janice Doane and Devon Hodges. London and New York: Methuen, 1987.
Pp. 160. $22.50 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).
In the nineteenth century, "nostalgia" was a medical term denominating a
specific form of mental disease-a yearning for one's home or country. For
twentieth-century readers, the term has acquired a rather different cluster of
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meanings; it implies now a particular set of attitudes towards history-the
longing for a state which has passed, whether in one's own life, or in that of
society as a whole. No longer is nostalgia considered a form of mental pathology, a disease which should be subjected to medical correction, but is
viewed rather as a fairly harmless attitude of mind to which we are all more
or less prone. In Nostalgia and Sexual Difference, Doane and Hodges examine
the invidious operations of nostalgia within contemporary discourse, as writers from a whole spectrum of fields attempt to deflect the challenge of feminism. Coming at a time when the new right is gaining an increasing ideological stranglehold, both in Reagan's America and Thatcher's England, the
study is particularly welcome.
The authors have chosen an interesting series of figures to examine, ranging from novelists such as George Stade and John Irving through to such influentialliterary and cultural critics as Christopher Lasch, Harold Bloom, Ivan
Illich, and Peter Berger. Although the list is necessarily eclectic, and cannot
hope to be inclusive, one very surprising omission is that of the work of female writers. The study looks neither at the work of avowedly anti-feminist
female writers (with the exception of Brigitte Berger), nor considers in depth
the more problematic category of feminist writers who themselves employ
nostalgic modes of thought. Although Hodges and Doane frequently refer to
the work of feminists who endorse fixed models of sexual difference (and
thus qualify, according to the authors' definition, for the nostalgia camp),
they do not focus on their work directly, or examine the reasons underlying
their particular choice of theoretical position. The project as a whole suffers
in consequence: "nostalgia" emerges as a loosely-defined term, associated
preeminently with a desire to maintain patriarchal authority, and the cultural
and political complexities of the feminist struggle are glossed over.
In their discussion of the representation of the figure of the feminist, or
"monstrous amazon/' in contemporary male fiction, the authors point astutely to the ways in which social ideologies of "fun" are used to disarm serious feminist critiques. The authors' own tendency to adopt a sanctiomonious
tone, however, does little to help their argument. Of Ishmael Reeds' work,
Reckless Eyeballing, they observe, for example, that '" naturally,' we have an
author who is also supposed to be outside all the cultural codes he is so obviously reproducing, despite the fact that these books, as even their authors
must realize, are consumer products" (p. 43). Here as elsewhere, the author
emerges in comparison with the sharp-eyed critic as a very blinkered creature, endowed with a critical naivete about his own work which is almost
touching. Are novelists really the last people in the world to realize that their
works are consumer products? The supposition, in this case, that Reed believed himself to be outside the cultural codes codes he was reproducing
seems to be entirely that of Hodges and Doane.
Throughout this study the authors tend to overplay their hand. Although
the foundations of their arguments are usually good, they weaken their case
by attributing to the subjects of their study a particularly simplistic belief in
the realist illusion which they then proceed to debunk. A potentially interesting discussion of John Irving's The World According to Carp, for example, is
marred by their insistence that "for Irving, narrative structure is a natural
way to achieve and reflect the truth" (p. 73). This assertion rests in tUrn on
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the rather curious claim that the novel follows a traditional narrative sequence. Although Garp cannot rival the experimentalism of the modern
French novel, it clearly departs, with its several embedded narratives, from a
conventional linear format, and far from unreflectively endorsing notions of
narrative "truth/' it takes the issue of narrativity as one of its subjects. Irving,
like Reed, is turned in this study into a strawman, representative of an indefensible position. Theoretical debate ceases to be productive, however, if it is
conducted on the grounds of attributing to one's opponent the weakest position possible.
The framework of Doane and Hodges' critique of nostalgia will be familiar
to readers of contemporary critical theory: realism's belief in a stable referent
(a position here aligned with nostalgia) is set against a commitment to the
philosophy of linguistic "play," a belief that identity and difference are constructed in language. It remains unclear, however, whether this framework is
adequate to the political exigencies of the contemporary struggle against a
right-wing backlash. With its insistent, reiterated demonstrations of the illusions of referentiality, the Derridean and Lacanian position could itself be
convicted of a form of nostalgia (albeit expressed in a displaced, negative
form): a yearning for lost plenitude, for the moment of full presence, whose
absence can only be adequately compensated for by renewed assertions of its
impossibility. If such demonstrations are to be rendered political useful they
must be treated as the beginning, rather than the self-sufficient end of inquiry. In their treatment of Ivan I11ich, the authors contrast his commitment
to sexual stereotypes and "going backwards" to their own, more open belief
in the linguistic construction of difference: "If differences are in the making,
real surprise is possible. We look to the future" (p. 113). Such a simple assertion bypasses all the problems raised in the recent complex theoretical debates concerning the relationship betw-een language and the material world,
and the peculiar difficulties faced by women in attempting to employ patriarchallanguage as an instrument of social change. Although the authors would
probably disagree with much of this scholarship they need to take it into account, to demonstrate why the perceived problems are in fact illusory.
Of the figures considered in the book, Ivan Illich, together with Peter and
Brigitte Berger, offers potentially the most interesting profile. When this erstwhile radical spokesman can speak of women's "flesh" being frustrated
when they are thrust out of their normal "homemaking" role, one knows
that something has gone badly wrong. Illich and Peter Berger, two of the
most prominent cultural gurus of the radical left in the 60s and 70s, are now
making pronouncements on gender politics which would seem to proceed directly from the camp of the moral majority. Why is this happening? Could
these positions have been implicit in their earlier work? and have they both
shifted their political stance in other areas, or is this phenomenon peculiarly
associated with the domain of gender? Although Doane and Hodges offer an
analysis of the discourse of their two selected texts, this relative narrowness
of focus hinders them from raising these larger questions. Nor do they address the issue of why, at this specific political moment, the backlash against
feminism has occurred. The Berger text in particular deserves a more complex
analysis than it receives: there is frequently a disjunction behveen the quoted
text and the views Doane and Hodges then attribute to the Bergers. Interest-
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ingly, Peter Berger does not seem to have shifted too far from the epistemological position he outlined (with Thomas Luckmann) in his influential work,
The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Does this therefore mean that this
position is not inherently radical but is in fact compatible with a thoroughgoing conservatism? The question is an important one for Doane and Hodges
since their own theoretical stance and political platform is grounded on very
similar foundations to that of Berger's earlier work. If a commitment to linguistic constructivism can be used to sustain a socially reactionary stance,
then clearly any effective political response to the new right cannot solely be
confined to an attempt to overturn "realism" and its associated epistemological tenets.
This recent shift to the right in gender politics is not confined to male cultural spokesmen: early leaders of the women's movement are also involved.
Doane and Hodges allude to the fact that figures such as Betty Friedan, Germaine Greer and Jean Elshtain have all "expressed concern about feminism's
effect on founding structures" (p. 134) but they do not pursue this crucial issue. Why are all these influential figures seemingly turning their back on all
our apparent gains? Are their responses particular to the internal dynamics of
the women's movement, or are they directly related to the wider political
spectrum? Nostalgia seems at the moment to provide the ideological fuel for
the entire right-wing political platform. Thatcher's reign in England is
grounded on her claims to be returning to the world of "Victorian Values." It
is a moot point, however, whether the sentiments of nostalgia are in themselves necessarily inherently reactionary. In the Victorian age itself, for example, the celebration of medieval culture had diverse political connotations: in
the hands of Carlyle it was turned into a defence of a fixed, hierarchical society, but in William Morris' writings it formed the basis of a radical critique of
industrial capitalism. Even in the works of Marx one can discern the workings of nostalgia. His famous yearning for a time when all men could be
hunter, fisher, shepherd, and critic within the compass of a day clearly draws
its strength from the nostalgic rhetoric of a golden age. Although such visions are undoubtedly illusory, they nonetheless serve a necessary political
function in offering a rallying impetus for action. Could nostalgia perform a
similar function for the women's movement? or are all its manifestations necessarily linked to a reactionary political stance?
In their postscript, Hodges and Doane directly confront the problem that
many feminist writers actively endorse a politics of sexual difference
(whether they perceive this "difference" to be biologically or only culturally
grounded). The authors admit that it could be argued that" effective political
action depends on women's ability to define themselves as different, as a distinct group" but conclude that such a perception "underestimates the connection between the decentralization of the feminist movement and its strength:
because there are many feminisms, the movement does not depend on the
fortunes of a single leader or group. We are accustomed to think in terms of
the powers associated with accumulation and identity rather than of the
powers associated with dispersion and rupture precisely because the conventions of discourse, based on binary oppositions that preserve identity, insist
that we do" (p. 141). Is the belief that power derives from unity and coherence solely a convention of discourse? The problem of identity is a peculiarly
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tangled one for feminist activists. If one opposes biological essentialism, and
the male grouping of "woman," is one left without a constituency from
which to fight? To point to the advantages of decentralisation is not to resolve the problem: even within a dispersed group, one still needs a platform
from which to speak, an ideological rallying point. To insist on the powers of
dispersion and rupture is to view the social through the limiting grid of linguistic theory. Have the strategies of dispersion and rupture ever been effective in a concrete, political struggle? If the thrust of the contemporary backlash against feminism is to be itself dispersed and contained, it must be met
by a united front, which extends its activities beyond the domain of language.

University of Leeds

Sally Shuttleworth

Patte,."s of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures by Michael Baxandall. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. x
Ills. 62. $18.95.

+

147.

For a number of years Michael Baxandall has played an important if discreet part in orienting art historical inquiry away from questions of connoisseurship and inconography towards a more rigorous historicism, Preoccupied
with the ways in which extra-artistic pressures,-whether economic, political,
religious, cultural, social, linguistic, scientific, or geographical-have come to
shape works of art, Baxandall has suggested new terms by which art, in particular Renaissance painting and sculpture, may be understood as an expression of its time and place. His Giotto and tile Omlors (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971) revealed how visual taste of the early Renaissance, as.exemplified in the notion of composition, was shaped by the conventions of humanist rhetoric, while Painting and Experience in Fifteentlt-Century Italy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972) discussed quattrocento style as a response to
popular social and economic practices of the time such as dancing and merchantile systems of proportion. A more recent study, The Umewood Sculptors
of Renaissance Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) proposed
to "look through the sculptures into Renaissance Germany, the carvings
being sometimes addressed as lenses bearing on their own circumstances"
(p. vii).
Baxandall's concerns with the conditions under ,,,,hich a work of art is produced and consumed have come to be shared by a number of art historians.
As yet, however, this "new historicism" does not offer a method, for beyond
the general consensus that the intersection between culture and history needs
to be more carefully examined, there are significant disagreements about ho\\'
historical interpretation should proceed. This was the subject of a session at
the College Art Association's annual meeting in 1985 entitled" Art or Society: l\lust \Ve Choose?" Chaired by Sevtlana Alpers, the panel included
Thomas Crow, Stephen Greenblatt, Natalie Zemon Davis, and !\.·Iichael Baxandall: the proceedings were published in Rcprl'sclltafic))ls (No. 12, Fall 1985,
pp. 1-4:3). As that session made clear, the nen' historicism needs to be exam-
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ined in terms of its relationship to what might be called the "old historicism"
(history of ideas, social history, traditional Marxism) and to the current debate over critical theory and language. Baxandall's cautious and at times dissenting voice in the discussion at eAA would lead one to expect that his
present book, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures,
would offer an exposition not only of the problems of historical interpretation
as he sees them, but also an analysis of these problems within a larger critical
framework. Unfortunately, the book is a disappointment on both counts.
Patterns of Intention begins by asking on what grounds we offer an historical interpretation of a picture, how we go about "inferring" intention in a
work in order to place it histOrically. Baxandall's first task is to explore the
language of art criticism. While his discussion of the effect of language engages many of the issues raised by structuralist and deconstructionist literary
critics, his interest stops short of pure linguistic hermeneutics, of treating the
work of art as a text, for instance, or determining its role as a signifier. His
impatience with this kind of theoretical approach is obvious: "the useful role
for historians bent on reflection seems to me not to offer loose prescriptive
generalizations under the description of 'theory' but rather to test quite simple positions against cases as complex as time and energy permit" (p. vii).
While one might sympathize with Baxandall's intent not to turn his book into
a meditation on deconstruction, it is nevertheless disturbing to find the important problems of language and representation raised either directly or implicitly by his method dismissed on the grounds of utility. His anti-theoretical
pragmatism is not so complete as to do away with the problema tics of critical
language. He observes, for instance, that the inferences we make about a picture when we describe it are "less a representation of the picture, or even a
representation of seeing a picture, than a representation of thinking about
having seen a picture," hence our description will not refer to the picture but
to the "effect the picture has on us," and wili depend "for such precision as it
has on the presence of the picture" (p. 11). Unfortunately this process of cognitive representation, the fact that such language is by necessity subjective
and histOrically shaped and in this sense radically interpretive, is not subsequently addressed in full.
One of the main purposes of his discussion of critical language would seem
to be to discount the relevance of the linguistic and semiological concepts of
reflected meaning or connotation in formulating an historical interpretation
of pictures. Baxandall observes that "in art-critical description one is using
the terms not absolutely; one is using them in tandem with the object ...
What is determining for them is that, in art criticism or art history, the object
is present or available-really, or in reproduction, or in memory, or (more
remotely) as rough visualization derived from knowledge of other objects of
the same class' (p. 8). What is problematic in this statement, however, is that
reality, reproduction, memory and rough visualization are presented as
equivalent forms of imagistic "presence," and that their power to impose a
second order of meaning on the image is not considered. Thus Baxandall's
description of the "facts of language that become prominent in art criticism
... that have radical implications for how one can explain pictures" (p. 11) is
compromised from the start by an indifference to the complexities of these
facts.
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In what would seem to be a similar utilitarian gesture toward simplifying
the process of historical interpretation, he dismisses the "more structured
models offered by various versions of Ideology" preferring instead a "simple
model of exchange" to describe the relationship between the painter and his
culture (p. viii). Baxandall describes this exchange with the French term
"troe," which means a barter or swap. By his own admission the book is not
about the "dynamics of culture" and thus if "told that the book is inadequate
as a sociology of art I shall be unmoved" (p. viii). Baxandall's use of a utopian model of exchange is a nostalgic fiction that enables him to avoid considering the concrete processes that have historically regulated human institutions and existence. One questions the wisdom of using such an a-historical
model as the basis for an "historical interpretation of pictures" when so
much of that interpretation depends on accurately illucidating the philosophical, ecomonic, and material relationships that obtain between art and society.
As his indifference to the sOciology of art suggests, Baxandall's method attempts to consider the role of culture within art without ever considering the
role of art within culture. As a result, the works of art he treats become mere
reflections of various aspects of culture rather than agents of culture, and culture functions primarily as an influence rather than as a context. Along these
lines, Baxandall has suggested that because, IIiArt' and 'society' ... are unhomologous systematic constructions put upon interpenetrating subject matters," in order "to get neat matches" we must "work through derived middles between 'art' and 'society', namely a) 'culture' and b) that element in
'art' that can be seen as institutional or as a function of institutions" (Representations, 12, pp. 42-43). Baxandall's discovery and characterization of some
of these middle grounds where the work of art and its historical circumstances interpenetrate in the process of exchange ("troc") has been a major
contribution to the study of art in its social context. What has been less helpful is his tendency to reduce all that is meant by art and society in order for
his mechanistic model of "troc" to work.
In order for troe to work, differences must become equivalencies, thus Baxandall must ignore the presence in the work of art signs of class and other
forms of social difference (gender, race, sexuality). Rather than speak of class,
Baxandall prefers to speak of experience" as if it were somehow uniform
and one dimensional. Not surprisingly the book's most powerful chapter illustrates a rare case when an artist's and society's definition of experience repressed questions of social difference in an attempt to establish a universal
standard of perception. In Chardin's painting of A Lady Drinking Tea, Baxandall's method finds its perfect analogue in the painter's own empiricism. Focusing on the "relations between the visual interest of pictures and (taking
the extreme case) the systematic thought, science or philosophy, of the culture they come from" (p. 74), he begins by observing that certain areas
within the painting are less distinct than others, these inconsistencies of focus
or visual acuity respond to the new optics of Newton and Lock as they came
to be popularly understood in the eighteenth century. Here Baxandall's visual
analysis and scholarship is dazzlingly acute. His discussion of the painting
and the texts that impinge on it is a model of all that is visually and intellectually compelling in his approach. Under Baxandall's scrutiny, the painting
II
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becomes an ""enacted record of attention" which we re-enact when we look
at the painting; thus, he concludes: "Lockean pictures represent, in the guise
of sensation, perception or complex ideas of substance, not substance itselflr
(pp. 102-103). One cannot help but wish that this essay had not ended with
a meditation on the way this painting may be seen to encapsulate Chardin's
longing for his fIrst wife. It is an observation which tends to collapse forgoing
analysis of the relation between the painting and its culture into a description
of the heroic and stoic nature of Chardin's vision. This sudden shift of focus
in the essay from the social to the personal avoids the problem of what the
painting's "effect of the real" might mean in the context of Chardin's public
and the cultural institutions that supported his vision. By way of comparison,
we have recently seen in Thomas Crow's Painters and Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Paris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; especially
chapters 4 and 5) and John Barrell's The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) how important
such questions can be when we attempt an historical interpretation of a
painting.
The troublesome limitations of Baxandall's positivist approach to historical
analysis are most evident in the chapters on Benjamin Barker's Bridge over
the Forth and Picasso's Portrait of Daniel Kahnweiler. It is perhaps unfair to be
too critical of these first two chapters because they are clearly intended to be
rudimentary introductions to Baxandall's basic analytic procedure rather than
full orchestrations of it. Yet given the subtlety of the mind at work, they are
disappointing. Baxandall discusses the historical intention of the work (its
"brief") as something mirrored in the appearance of the object. It is significant that he chooses to start with Barker's bridge since here we have a fairly
straight forward example of form following function. Baxandall proposes that
paintings, like bridges, are "pieces of problem solving" but is quick to note
that unlike bridges their manifest objective (or "charge") is not to "span" but
to create uvisual interest on the surface of a canvas." In spite of the care he
takes to distinguish bridges from pictures, the model of Barker's bridge does
color his analysiS of paintings, obscuring some of the problematic differences
between real objects and representations. According to the bridge model· we
find, by and large, that formalist paintings are about formalism (Picasso),
empirical paintings are about empiricism (Chardin), and religious paintings
are about religion (Piero).
His reading of the Portrait of Kahnweiler does not differ much from traditional formalist readings of Picasso's work. According to Baxandall, Picasso
internalized the general "charge" to create visual interest making it the central intention (or "brief") of his art. Given the limits of this brief, social realities, such as the art market, the public exhibition and the critics, are seen to
play a decidedly secondary role in determining Picasso's formal choices.
While it would be wrong to argue that Cubism is not a formalist movement
within modem painting or that the Kahnweiler portrait does not demonstrate
a formal engagement of Cezanne's work, to limit this formalism to a "meditation on his [Picasso's] own perceptual process' (p. 71) and to offer this as an
historical interpretation for the painting is perverse. By contrast, Yve-AIain
Bois challanging and perceptive historical explanation of this formalism reveals the importance of Saussure's structural linguistics for Cubism ("Kahn-

Criticism, Vol. XXX, No.1: Book Reviews

123

weiler's Lesson," Representations, No. 18, Spring 1987, pp. 33-68). Bois analysis does not do away with Cubism's formalism it simply sets out its meaning in the context of larger historical and epistemological developments. If we
see Picasso's Portrait of Kahnweiler only in terms of Picasso's meditation on
his own perceptual process, we may have reconstructed an aspect of the
work' 5 intention but we remain in a state of mystification if we mistake this
for the work's historical meaning or significance. Too often what Baxandall
would seem to be performing is what Croce would call archaeology (the sorting and ordering of primary data) not history (the interpretation of that data).
Baxandall's reluctance to involve his analysis in any form of second order
interpretation, (discussions of representation, connotation, ideology, myth,
"meaning"), and his tendency to dismiss their relevance by trying to establish a model for historical intention that excludes them does not set him very
far apart from the formalist and iconographic interpretive traditions in art
history. It is interesting then to find that, in the last chapter, Baxandall's attempts to distinguish his process of inferential criticism from iconography by
contrasting several iconographical interpretations of Piero della Francesca's
Baptism of Christ with his own analysis of its historical intention. The chapter
is intended to show how we can explain "the intention of an artist living in a
culture or period remote from our own" (p. 105), and the fault he finds with
the various iconographical readings of the painting is that by falling back
"into the habit of looking for 'meaning' one sought 'signs' and of course immediately found them. The second source of error was to attend too little to
Piero's peculiar pictorial idiom . .. " (p. 125). Piero's "brief," as reconstructed
by Baxandall, consisted of "producing in his idiom an altarpiece image (with
all that implies) in which the main heads of the matter of Matthew 3 are
effectively treated in an active relation to a pictorial tradition itself constituting part of the problem" (p. 131). This conclusion does not in the end seem
any less reductive than the various iconographical interpretations of the
painting which Baxandall rightly questions. The reason for this has to do
with the limitations Baxandall has placed all along on the notion of "intention" which he sees as "an analytical construct about his [the artist's] ends
and means, as we infer them from the relation of the object to identifiable
circumstances" (p. 109). What such a definition refuses to consider is the possibility that a painting as a representation of historical intention may ultimately exceed that intention in ways that its original purpose and meaning
could neither anticipate nor control. Baxandall's basic confidence in the denotative power of the image skews his analysis of historical intention in such a
way as to reduce nearly all questions of meaning to mechanistic descriptions
of formalist causality.
My emphasis on the theoretical implications of Baxandall's treatment of
the works he discusses has not allowed me to do justice to the many provocative and profound insights contained in these interpretations. One admires
the depth and range of knowledge that he continually brings to a topic, and
even more so when it results, as in the Chardin chapter, in a new and important revelation about the cultural context of a work. One is also continually
struck by the sensitivity of his eye and the veracity of his visual analysis even
when his method prevents him from fully developing the historical implications of an artist's formal choices. Thus his refusal to openly engage the cur-
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rent debates over representation, ideology, and language seems all the more
unfortunate given the strength of his intellectual powers and the subtlety of
her visual perceptions. Nevertheless, because this refusal would seem to con-

fIrm the relevance of this debate to the formation of his own intellectual position, his aloofness from the fray finally appears to disguise a rather aggresive
guerrilla attack. One might ask: "What is Baxandall's brief?" The problems
with which he deals are fundamentally linguistic, so his evasion of them by
alternately insisting on his lack of expertise in this area or their inconvenient

complexity has the unhappy effect of elevating this "ignorance" and "expediency" to the level of a method.
While Baxandall may not care to deal with the problems of modem linguistic theory, modem linguistic theory is only too ready and able to deal
with his. For instance, in aspiring to a straightforward approach to historical
intention, one which scrupulously avoids the tenninology of contemporary
critical discourse as surely as it avoids its concepts, Baxandall must invent a

jargon of his own. Merely to use the old language of art history would not
register his awareness of contemporary theory or his reaction against it. Thus

the terms "brief," "charge," and "troc," come into play, terms that clearly
describe the denotative relationship Baxandall wishes to reassert between the
work of art and its historical intention. In aspiring to the level of linguistic
transparency and universal legibility, his terminology evokes a mythic homogeneous audience who share this language. Just as the realities of class and
social difference are suppressed in his historical interpretation of pictures so
too are they silenced in his discourse. While it is certainly not his intention, it
is unfortunate that Baxandall's book will appeal most to those who wish to
preserve the status quo in art history by holding the fIeld against any further
incursions from other disciplines (especially literature), and who will now
have a new way to naturalize their position as historicism, art history, and

perhaps even history itself.

University of California, lroine

Ann Bermingham

Theatrical Legitimation: Allegories of Genius in Seventeenth-Century England
and France by Timothy Murray. New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987. Pp. xli

+ 292, 9 figures. $22.50.

Theatrical Legitimation is an insistently, self-professediy challenging book;
its quarry is the "new historicism" and the discipline of comparative literature, and the charge against both is their submission to "master-narratives"

of continuity that permit the recovery of a past-without-difference. To these
diSciplines, the book's title offers its answer, a legitimization of theatricality
as criticism-or, better, as theory, since the etymolOgical connection of theater and theory is taken to guarantee the enterprise. "Allegory" is (thanks to
Walter Benjamin and Paul deMan) another word for theory in this study,
which reads instances of seventeenth-century theatricality through the discourses of anti-theatricality mounted by the "puritan" and Baconian opponents of the English stage and their Jansenist counterparts in France. Murray
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aims to demonstrate how the antitheatrical charges were met by strategies to
contain theater and to show the limits of these endeavors. Since containment
is what he studies, his evidence is taken from the margins that police the
drama-the textual apparatus of Ben Jonson's Workes, the epistles that frame
French theater texts, the theory of d' Aubignac. The first aims to secure the
genius of the author, the second the genius of Richelieu, the partron, the
third, the genius of the spectator. In the readings of these frames, Murray
argues for a deconstructive play an abime, a phantasmal allegoresis with unbounded energies that refuse stabilization. If these are the frames of reason,
continuity, coherence, they are disrupted by what they mean to secure-theater and rhetoric. They offer "the phantasm of legitimate interpretation"
(p. 17) that haunts the 'new' historicism and comparative literature, heirs of
the antitheatricality and rationalism of the seventeenth-century. Murray reveals the "epistemological impurities" (p. 7) that undermine the frames; they
legitimate his practice by overturning the norms of legitimation.
Such, crudely stated, is the argument that prefaces the book, summarizing
it. And, occasionally, as the book proceeds, these claims about the status of
the book (its relation to the prevailing disciplinary practices) are reiterated,
but not developed. Rather, by the last chapter, Murray tilts with Ernst Cassirer as the evil genius of comparatism, and suggests a Kantian genealogy for
him that arrives at Habermas and notions of rational consensus. In those final pages, and occasionally earlier (usually at the beginnings or ends of chapters or sections) the banner of theory is waved, normally by a flurry of citations, or an honorific rolecall: "contemporary readers from Jean-Luc Nancy
and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to Louis Marin and Michel Foucault delineate
carefully and laboriously the paradigms upon which French neoclassicism is
often understood to depend" (p. 193). What they have done so "carefully
and laboriously," Murray does not stop to do. Theory is invoked throughout
the book, so that to criticize it would be to criticize theory. The book, rather,
"carefully and laboriously" delimits its activities to thge margins. The gesture
is no doubt theoretical, sanctioned by Margins of Philosophy or "Parergon" or
"Cartouches," or, perhaps better, the book simulates the gestures of theory.
Yet its aim, to reveal the ruin of truth, goes no further than an overturning.
Its truth is the charges of the antitheatricalists-the theater cannot be secured
against its demonismi its truth, then, within its self-proclaimed terms, is antitheoretical. And saying this is not just to play with words; for theater, banished from Murray's text as it would be for any antitheatricalist, is, by its absence, secured as a locus of energy, freedom, sexuality, imagination. In the
thinly disguised misogyny of this text, theater might be (is) called woman.
"Carefully and laboriously," Murray devotes his first hundred pages to a
reading of the textual apparatus of the first Jonson folio, to the design of the
title page, the layout of the catalogue of contents, the disposal of text and editorial apparatus in the masques. The point of the argument is that Jonson's
antitheatricality manifests itself in his move from stage to page, and that
print, with its enforcing frames, attempts to reposition theater as text, with all
the stability that Elizabeth Eisenstein has claimed for the technology. Murray
cannot be faulted for demurring from this mythos of authorial genius or its
supposed enshrinement in the book, the "figuration and fetishization of authorial genius" (p. 65) manifest through a technology that is not merely a
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mode of mechanical reproduction. Under suspicion, he reads Jonson's "textual sovereignty" (P. 73) and its allegory of the authorial mind fully in control of text and reader. The critical consensus that Murray plucks from this
configuration he calls "Jonson & Johnson," a corporation devoted to reason
and scandalized by theatrical excess. Murray's figure embraces Cleopatra.
I have no desire to argue against this representation of Jonson; it is compelling. It is also familiar, as Murray acknowledges, citing Jonas Barish, Richard
Newton, Richard Helgerson (although work along these lines by Thomas
Greene and David Quint is ignored). What Murray adds to this work is an
animus directed against it and an elaboration of the protocols of legitimate
reading. Thus, glancing at the catalogue, Murray secures his argument that
the patron is subordinated to the work of art by the typography of the second line of the catalogue, where the columns of names of works and names
of designated patrons virtually meet; "Every Man out of his Humor, To the
INNES of COVRT," the line reads, and Murray reads it: "Unlike the other
sets of title and dedication, this pair's textual spacing is contiguous, thus
stresing the title's minimizing the difference between play and dedication.
Spatial contiguity here catalyzes the nominal association of Jonson's plays
with the ideal reading public of courtly society" (p. 75). Similarly, pausing
over the titlepage, Murray ponders the presence of the PASTOR that seems
so out of place on the theatrical scene; and, not surprisingly, he emerges as a
figure of Jonson the critic. These are strained arguments. The textual apparatus is read as if every point must deliver the thesis. This is "allegorical"
reading indeed, but it is not deManian; rather it is a dogged point-for-point
allegorism. And the theory that it manifests is just the sort that those who
proclaim themselves against theory decry: global and universalizing abstraction. Such theory is complicit with the project of the dehistoricized corporation that Murray calls Jonson & Johnson.
Jonson's textual sovereignty banishes the sovereign from Murray's pages;
with the French theater, Richelieu comes to take that place. Within the professedly anti-('new') historicist aims of this theoretical reading, Murray transports Stephen Orgel's readings of Jacobean court theater to the French scene
without considering the legitimacy of that move. As a theorist his concern is
anything but the master-narrative of continuity or the comparatist's reiteration of the same. Thus, claims that have been made elsewhere are transported elsewhere as if they were only true in France. As Murray reads the
epistles prefacing French drama of the mid-seventeenth century, he finds
them portraying an allegory of legitimacy for the theater through the portrait
of the patron. Richelieu is constructed through this discourse, so that his performance as spectator of theater legitimates it: "Richelieu's face reflected the
vision of his perspective. And the actual depth of the cardinal's perception
was not as significant as the allegorical image of perspective-reason, judgment, and power-which the viewer was asked to perceive, indeed, was
asked to acknowledge, as Richelieu" (p. 122). Again, I would not quarrel
with this description but with the dehistoricized procedures it means to legitimate. (The margins of my copy of Theatrical Legitimation are littered with
queries-how is this 'eyeing' related to English absolutism, for example; how
is the constructed face related to that trope in Shakespeare; questions declared illegitimate by a comparativism that will not compare, and by the privilege of rupture; authors there, patrons here, and never the twain shall meet).
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These procedures are even clearer in the final section of the book, a 'lecture exacte' of D'Aubignac's La Pratiqlle dll tflea/rc. Here Murray sho\\'s his
colors (that's his trope for troping), revealing that the licencing of the pleasures of the spectator in D' Aubignac 'deconstructs' (that's his \vord for critical
demurral) the ideology of legitimacy, for the pleasures are-ultimately-a
woman's passion, over which 'reason, judgment, and power' cannot prevail.
The true theater is an invisible one, and what the spectator sees, moved by
the rhetoric of theater, is the primal scene. Mommy-or Julia Kristeva. "Energetic spectating always already critiques or, more specifically, deconstructs
the mechanisms of reason and taste sublime" (p. 216). In Tflcatrical LegitimatiOIl, energetic spectation occurs on the margins, \vatching a scene that is at
once never produced and over-produced.

The JOh11S Hopki11s U11iversity

Jonathan Goldberg

Recol1stnlctillg Individ1ialism. AutOllOIIIY, Illdividuality, alld the Self ill iVes/cm
Thought, edited by Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv + 365. $39.50 (cloth),
$11. 95 (paper).
This is a timely collection of essays whose unusually high quality and
whose disciplinary and methodological breadth will serve well the vcry
broad academic audience for which the collection was clearly conceived. At
the same time, the methodological variety may \vell raise a p;actical question
about the utility of this as a collection and a critical question about the collective theoretical consequence of these essays. A glance at the table of contents
indicates that the essays do not follow a theoretical or thematic progression.
(There is thus no preferred order in which to read the essays and the reader
is better off inventing her own.) The introduction by Heller and Vvellbery
notes that the "arrangement of the essays[ ... ]is necessarily contingent, reflecting one of several possible readings (pp. 2-3). This fact is apparent
enough, yet it is also one \vhich dra\vs attention to the lack of cumulative
force in the volume. The introduction's recourse to Richard Rorty's vague
and facile language about "an open and evolving conversation in which
voices from many disciplines work out shared views and differences in a
common labor of edification" does not compensate for the absence of a firm
sense of what is at stake in "reconstructing individualism" (p. i).
Possible doubt about the volume's theoretical consequence follows from
doubt about its usefulness as a collection. As its title suggests, the \'olume
proposes that it is time to reopen discussion of the concepts of au~onomy, individuality and selfhood. Although the contributions do engage these issues,
and some surpassingly, they all do so in application to a quite discrete topic
and "'ilhout agreement as to what is at issue in concepts like indi\'idualism
and autonon1\'. The reader \\'ill miss an\' discussion of the relation of ~ubjec
li\'ity and ind'ividualisITI in the modern age. This is a met<lcritical point which
11l<ly weli go be~'ond the objecti\'es of the contributors <15 \\'ell 015 the editors.
yet it is one that needs to be TT'Iade given the scope and \\'l'ightines':- ()f tIll'
mattl'rs considered.
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Cavils and questions do not detract from the individual distinctions of this
volume. By contrast with many recent volumes dedicated to the representation of a school or theory of criticism, this one allows differences plainly to
emerge. It is impossible to give all sixteen essays equal attention, but by
making clusters of a number of them I hope to elicit their peculiar contributions and differences.
Four essays in this volume, John Freccero's "Autobiography and Narrative," James Clifford's "On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski," Christine Brooke-Rose's "The Dissolution of Character in the Nove}" and Martha Nussbaum's "Love and the Individual" all center on the creation of self or character in narrative. The first, Freccero's, is also the lead
essay in the volume. Understandably so, in that his is an inviting, yet also
keen analysis of the difference between narrated and narrating self in autobiography, principally in Augustine's Confessions. Freccero points out the difference of Augustine's linear narration of converssion as one definitive temporal sequence from the mixed narration of Theresa of Avila, for whom there
is no final turning point from which the self is only the redeemed writing self
and no longer the self of conflict and historicity. Where Augustine projects
the moment of conversion into a whole temporal sequence and hence into an
ideal narrative of an ideal self, as faithful an imitator as Teresa is unable to
reiterate strictly his allegorization of self-history as salvation history. Hints
like this are not completely developed, yet they also need not have been.
Freccero gives us matter enough for reflection. The remaining three essays do
not attain Freccero's level of insight and clarity. Of the three, Brooke-Rose's,
though more a survey and proposal than an argument, is the most intriguing.
On the one hand, she seems to wish to honor the achievements of "postmodernist" fiction, that parodistic genre whose subject matter is previous fiction and its characters verbal structures. On the other, she apparently thinks
there is no future for fiction in meta-fiction. Instead, a regeneration of fiction
will entail an aspiration of prose to the dense verbal texture of poetry and a
renewed interest in character. The reader may only wonder whether such fiction is not already among us. I think of the late Pier Paolo Pasolini's prose as
one which has the evocative power of poetry and the live presence of character without being mistakeable for traditional fiction.
Clifford's essay sets for itself the promising task of tracing to c. 1900 the
emergence of a "distinctive ethnographic subjectivity" marked by "participant observation" (pp. 141, 142). The task is well formulated and includes
insights on "additive, metonymic empiricism," on "abrupt movement in imagery" and on "incongruence" as aspects of Conrad and Malinowski, yet its
execution is in the main a somewhat plodding back and forth comparison of
the two.
Nussbaum's essay stands out as the most idiosyncratic. Occasioned by the
discovery of a manuscript which had plagiarized her own work, Nussbaum
proceeds to use that ms., labled a "hybrid of fiction and philosophy," to
embed her own reflections on the individuality of the love object and the
identity 01 oneselilrom one love object to the next (pp. 253, 257). The reader
wonders whether Nussbaum herself escapes the label she has applied. The
multiple framing of narrative within narrative and philosophical reflection
within and on narrative requires an unusual finesse and skill in mediation of
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discourses. Proust, who receives significant mention in this essay, was the
master of that. Nussbaum does not reproduce his lesson.
One is on more even terrain with the essays which treat from several perspectives self-identity: Carol Gilligan's "Remapping the Moral Domain,"
Nancy Chodorow's "Towards a Relational Individualism" and Natalie Davis's "Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France," Gilligan's essay continues her widely recognized investigation into predispositions to autonomy and justice on the one side and to care and interaction on
the other, predispositions to which distinct versions of moral agency belong
(p. 241). In tracing these oppositional tendencies her concern is to break
down oppositions altogether. For Gilligan, the central metaphor of identity
formation should not be mirroring, with its connotations of isolation and exclusive attachment, but dialogue (pp. 250-51). Although this approach leads
Gilligan to reject the vocabulary of object relations as exceedingly separatist
and "mirroring," as grounded in self-reflexivity rather than interaction, it is
Chodorow who makes a strong case for the object-relations model as a
means of "reconstruct[ingJ a self [... J fundamentally implicated in relations
with others" (p. 199). Using Freud's "On Narcissism," Chodorow sees at
stake in the object-relations model not an insistence on the preserve of the
individual but "internal as well as external relatedness to the other" (p. 203).
Chodorow's constructive sense of self-reflexivity deepens Gilligan's argument
without undermining it.
Natalie Davis's essay, the one strictly historical contribution, is a lucid representation of how the social embeddedness of the individual, particularly
woman, in sixteenth-century France not only did not preclude self-discovery
but prompted it (p. 63). While it is true according to social convention that
women were" given away" in marriage, Davis makes the case that in practice
women could reverse this "cultural formation" and give themselves away
(p. 61). The idea is of historical consequence, since its truth entails conceiving
of a correspondingly greater self-consciousness among women and greater
sense of ownership of their own bodies. In the fine overlap it cuts between
the socia-cultural and the psychological Davis's essay refers both to Gilligan's and Chodorow's work and to Stephen Greenblatt's "Fiction and Friction," the recounting of the "prodigious" history of Marin Ie Marcis, a person
of ambiguous sexual identity whose want of proper sexual individuation
aroused among clerical and medical authorities of the early seventeenth-century awe, disbelief and, most instructively for Greenblatt's ends, a blind insistence that Marin be one sex or the other. If Marin himself was regarded as
marginal or worse, the discourse about him is representative of the way in
which the prodigious was not only used to articulate the normative but also
to "reintegrate" the prodigious into "normal structures of gender" (p. 45).
Like Davis, Greenblatt is clear about the historical and cultural specificity,
hence contingency and instability, of such structures. A difference between
them is the rhetorical finesse with which Greenblatt puts to methodical use a
metaphorical term like "friction," a term he shows was constitutively operative for Renaissance "knowledge" of sexual identity (pp. 38ff.).
The matters of identity and gender are cast in a different frame by Michael
Fried's "Courbe!'s Metaphysics: A Reading of the 'The Quarry.'" In a series
of highly discriminated analyses which trace a pattern of "displaced or meta-
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phorical self-representations," Fried argues that the "the primacy of selfrepresentation" in Courbet does not privilege the artist but constitutes a dispersal of the self among objects and perspectives where no hierarchical order
rules (pp. 91,95). Fried calls this effect one of "equivalence of translatability"
and sees it informing an ideal of the "absolute continuity of nature" (p. 99).
So if 'The Quarry,' as a scene of silenced violence, thematizes the reassertion
of such continuity even in the act of breaking it, the later canvas 'Death of
the Stag,' in narrating violence and pathos, reveals the fissures at the heart of
Courbefs enterprise.
Once one enters the philosophical region of this collection, any threads
one may have been able to pull together are likely, predictably, to unravel.
The essays of J.B. Schneewind and Ian Hacking on "The Use of Autonomy in
Ethical Theory" and "Making Up People" have this much in common, that
they warn us against the dangers of totalizing criticism (Schneewind) and totalizing explanation (Hacking). Schneewind does recognize the limitations
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy: it does not presuppose,
much less demonstrate, the existence of a substantial self or transcendental
ego. Yet the concept of autonomous criticism and action is necessary if one is
to think of society as self-legislating. (The editors' version of this argument in
their introduction is quite different, pp. 5-6.) Hacking's essay is appealingly
provisional in conception and tone as it pursues the argument that what I call
myself and what I do, or what others call me and what I do, depends on "the
possibilities of description." This dependence is neither chronological nor ontological but has the structure of simultaneity: possibility and descriptive
structure "emerge[dJ hand in hand" (p. 225). Hacking wisely stops at this. He
declines to predict that any general theory of making up people is to be had
and thus avoids any massive generalizations on the nature of social control
and power.
The essays of two other philosophers, Werner Hamacher and Stanley Cavell, are both the longest contributions and both equally unsuited to summary,
albeit for altogether different reasons. Given the current interest in the continental sources of contemporary literary and critical theory, Hamacher's reading of Nietzschean individualism as a thing beyond all category and concept,
as "unaccountable surplus," serves as an exemplary lesson in thoroughness
and rigor of argument (p. 110). In fact so thorough is Hamacher's exposition
that one occasionally has the sense, also acquired from reading Foucault, that
the expositor has been impersonally absorbed into the exposition. Hamacher
writes wholly without the mannerisms-punning, tentativeness of assertion,
self-regarding playfulness-which have marked much recent writing on
Nietzsche. Still, for all its sobering rigor and consequence, Hamacher's essay
does not entirely shun the declamatory pathos of Nietzsche's own assertions:
monological art . . . is theocidaI. It knows no other and recognizes no
God who could betoken its determinate destiny" (p. 128). (For another view
of Nietzsche one must tum to Paolo Valesio's brilliant but aphoristically discontinuous essay "The Beautiful Lie.")
Finally, Cavell's "Being Odd, Getting Even: Threats to Individuality" contains remarks on the reader's obedience to and enactment of texts which
strike me as truly important for any theory of interpretive understanding.
The essay as a whole, however, will prove somewhat recalcitrant to anyone
11
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not already initiated into the peculiar discursivity of, say, The Claim of RcaThough Cavell's essay may be an extreme case, it points up a drawback
of this volume: despite the very high quality of the essays, taken as (l group
they presuppose both too much and too little: too much of the contexts out of
\vhich they individually come and too little of a common ground or set of
questions. This book will be highly valued, if chiefly according to the individual needs readers bring to it.

SOIl.

Ulliversity of Tliisa

John Jay Baker

Poetic Forlll and British RomaJlticism by Stuart Curran. Ne\v York: Oxford
University Press, 1986. Pr. ix

+

265. $22.95.

This is a richly informative book, wide-ranging in scope and lovingly detailed in exposition, \vhieh sustains and is sustained by an argument that no
scholar of Romanticism, British or Continental, can afford to disregard. \-Yith
this argument-that we misinterpret the Romantic movement by supposing it
to involve the dissolution of traditional genres-I shall wish to express measured disagreement on several counts, but with no intention of undercutting
Curran's solid achievement.
The sheer diversity of what he has done is best shown, perhaps, simply by
listing, as a litany of praise, a few of his most instructive semi-detachable arguments: One finds here the best pages yet written on Leigh Hunt, whom
Curran treats as the first English Biedermeier poet, a pioneer in the conscious
adaptation of bourgeois values to serious art. The "Whig political ode," dating from Collins and culminating in Shelley's finely-appreciated "Ode to Liberty," is usefully isolated by Curran as a legitimate subgenre. In the chapter
on "Pastoral," which is arguably the best, there is a splendid historical discussion of the "proletarian anti-pastoral" from Gay to Crabbe (this connection in itself bespeaks an impressive alertness to the affinity of oppositions)
and then on to \-Yordsworth, "the greatest of England's pastoral poets," with
fine readings of "Michael," the appropriate Lyrical Ballads, and much else.
Perhaps most interesting of all is the emphasis Curran properly and originally places on the machinery of Robert Southey's quest-romances, which
needed only to be rendered a little more subjective and suggestively obscure,
he argues, to become the Visionary Cars of the major Romantic narrativcs
and closet dramas. Anyone who has ever struggled to explain the litC'rJryhistoricill bJckground of J poems like Promcf/lclIs Un/ 101l11d or Cain to students, knowing that it is not enough to cite the precedent of classicJI Jnd
biblicJI machines, will disco\'cr in Curran's discussion of Southey a mystl'ry
To turn to till' thesis which propels the::e Jnd the rcst of Curran's nbscf\'Jtil111S: he, Cun,ln, is r:lllti-Schlcgel and, more subtl~', Jnti-AbrJITIS, That j<."
O\'l'r against the carl\' nineteenth-century Continental interest in the J1(l\,l'listic ,,\(,/;'11:: l!l1i1'n·~1i1I/. -\\'ith ,111 the polyglossal pan-gencric irony I1lndl'rn fl',hi
crs suppose tl~ h,l\'l~ been disCll\'Cred by Bakhtin. and l~n)r a!~"jn.;~ \L I!
:\l'ram<s c,lllllnical rL'adin~ (~f Romanticism ,1 .. a ml'ta],h:'sics, .1'- ,1 n'"i~u,lt](ln
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of the subject vis-a-vis the object (leading to such pan-generic concepts as
"natural supernaturalism" and "the greater Romantic lyric"), Curran maintains that the major poets of British Romanticism, not to mention the circumambient literati of that era, continued to use the traditional literary "kinds"
they inherited from the Humanists, the Pleiade, and the Neo-Classical writers in order to signal as precisely and intricately as possible their estrangement from that very inheritance. Thus in place of any emphasis on the pangeneric (the novelistic from Schlegel to Bakhtin, the "hieropoetic" [Michel
Beaujour] from Navalis to Blanchot, the anti-Aristotelian from Plato to Derrida), and in studied neglect of these issues as one finds them discussed in
L'Absolu litteraire (by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthes and Jean-Luc Nancy) and in
a special issue of Glyph (7[1980]) he consigns to a footnote (p. 222), Curran
proffers his own emphasis on the" countergeneric," with wonderful practical
results, especially in the discussions of pastoral and rumance I have mentioned, but with considerably less theoretical success.
In the first place, he runs the danger of oversimplifying period concepts. It
is doubtful whether the Romantics themselves presented a solid front on this
topic. Are Blake (for whom the genres conveniently modify the unvarying
vocation of prophecy) and Wordsworth (whose pointed internalization of generic concepts constitutes an apology for the organization of his 1807 collection of poems) really to be understood as literary-historical allies of Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats, whose versatile and exuberant adaptation of
existing genres is unquestionably a shared trait and does indeed merit Curran's compensatory emphasis? More troublesome still is a tendency in Curran

that one finds in all Period apologetics, namely, the need for a contrastive
under-valuation of earlier periods: thus a Pope scholar will not gladly hear
that the "hegemony of neoclassical rules, with their simpleminded and impossible clarity" (p. 8) awaited the sophistications of Romanticism to find
their true justification. Even if we prOvisionally accept the hermeneutic guidance of generic determinacy (the obvious practical value of which this book
everywhere demonstrates), there remains the question whether this detenninacy is best treated historically: granting the implausibility of a post-generic
text, can we name any literary text worth thinking about that is not already
counter-generic? It might be safer to isolate as an historical constant what the
Russian Formalists called "parody" (within which generic reorientation may
or may not be an aspect of change), a constant already firmly in place, as the
best recent commentary shows, in Homer, Pindar, and Theocritus.
But it is not in fact safe even proviSionally to promote generic Signals to a
privileged place among the gUidelines for interpretation. What one then too
frequently falls back upon is a wholly undemonstrable antinomy conceived
as the tension between tradition (genre) and the individual talent (countergenre). Thus in sentences like "[i]t could be argued that the particular tradition associated with the pastoral elegy wholly determines the thrust of the
poem, but that would be to deny Shelley'S creative independence and personal involvement in its issues" (p. 123), the rhetoric of scrupulously apportioned latitude cannot conceal the sheer element of undecldability in the
whole matter which is not just a local discomfort but in fact challenges any
and all category-based approaches to interpretation. While there is something
eXciting and suggestive in the epigrammatic assertion that Bryon's success in
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Childe Harold "came not from his contemplating himself in the poem, but

from his contemplating a genre in himself" (p. 157), the excitement is gnomic
rather than clarifying; and the arbitrariness of the choice between initiative
and regimentation becomes obvious when Curran writes, of The White Doe of
Rylstone, "if there can be no question that [Wordsworth's] own suffering over
the death of his brother John is reflected in the poem, the primary impulse
behind it is generic" (p. 142).
In the final chapter, this mediatory position expands into a thoroughgoing
discussion of the liberation-in-constraint paradox. (Surprisingly little thematization of form had been commented upon in the "Sonnet" chapter, where
those self-referential sonnets of Wordsworth and Keats which insist on this
very paradox were passed in review: is it accidental that Toussaint
L'Ouverture is a "revolutionary leader of the newly independent Haiti now
ironically languishing in prison" [po 47]?) But here more than ever an explicit
theoretical model is called for. What finally constrains discourse? Extrinsic or
"intrinsic" (Hirschian) genre? Personal feeling? Sociolect? And for Curran,
moreover, who allows some room for all these determinants as occasion arises, to what extent can they be said to coexist without open conflict?
The problem is largely resolved, as far as Curran himself is concerned, by
his steady and extreme intentionalism. As he handles it, the notion of countergenre blossoms into a celebration of that conscious artistry which his readings tautologically both assume and demonstrate. Together with the emphasis on genre one finds here an attempt to revive the Modernist discrimination
among poetic personae, not as a means of rendering the poet irrelevant (as in
Wimsatt and Beardsley) but rather as an expression-oriented (hence still "Romantic") confirmation of the poet's creative control. Plainly, a critic can be
expected to invoke genres and personae alike with the forensic purpose of refuting doctrines of passive inspiration (as if that could not prove to be more
rewardingly complex than any imaginable formal controU) or of the wild
warbling of native woodnotes. And sometimes it works. But Romanticism is
difficult to recognize when it is carried by critics who have assimilated their
Pound and Yeats to extremes of Modernist craft, and it is just in the degree to
which Curran does this, more here and less there, that one finds him more
devoted to singing hymns in praise of artistic unity as such (his hidden
agenda being a rebuke of current emphases on the disruption of form by intractable forces) than to delineating the intentional structure of a certain body
of literature. For him the rhetorical guarantor of formal control is "dialectic"
(frequently the give and take between personae), a word he overuses at just
those interpretive junctures where others today might overuse "mise en
abi'me" or "aporia."
Because Curran starts with formally definable genres and moves on to thematically definable and hence much more capacious-not to say baggygenres, the later chapters are less satisfying than the first ones. As one approaches something disarmingly called "Composite Genres" in the penultimate chapter (The Prelude and Don Juan are reserved for this chapter, making
the preceding chapter on "Epic" disappointingly thin), one comes to feel that
the Germanic tripartition of genres into narrative, dramatic, and lyric which
Curran had begun by rejecting would be at least as serviceable at this very
general level and perhaps less in need of special pleading. After all, whatever
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else one may say of it, "the modern critics's faith in an abstract lyrical moment" is at least as old as Goethe's notes to his West-Bstliche Divan and becomes canonical in Hegel, hence can scarcely be thought either anachronistic
or "a spurious distillation from Romanticism" (p. 11).
Not that special pleading is confined solely to those occasions when it has
become obvious that to speak of genre and to speak of theme are the same
thing: Wordsworth does not "misperceive" Gray's poem on the death of
West even incidentally because he fails to grasp its °dynamics" as a sonnet
(p. 30); and it is not helpful to say that '''the One Life within us and
abroad'" is "the essential principle of pastoral" (p. 110; perhaps it is, but
why then of pastoral only?). But these are increasingly petty cavils. Curran's
is a grandiy conceived and elegantly sustained work, from the preliminary
abecedarium of generic subtitles to the last gracenotes on the generic encyclopedism of Goethe. At its very strongest perhaps in the opening pages on
historical background in each chapter, the book additionally furnishes an excellent and varied series of brief readings. Without inflation or grandiosity, in
fact, Curran has found a way to write the sort of book surveying all the canonical Romantic writers that was every Romanticist's ambition at the time of
Bostetter and the early Bloom but seemed to have been exhausted-as a
genre-by Abrams. By his own example Curran proves the durability of
kinds.

Yale University

Paul H. Fry

Fictional Worlds by Thomas G. Pavel. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University
Press, 1986. Pp. xii

+ 182. $20.00

To readers of The Poetics of Plot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1985), Pavel's most recent book may come as a partial surprise. The
earlier book seemed content to work within the boundaries of narratology,
refining some of its established models, tentatively taking plot grammar one
step beyond the Proppian-structuralist legacy. Fictional Worlds tries to outstep
the narratological domain entirely, relocating fiction theory "at the crossroads
of literary criticism and philosophy" (p. 1). Pavel's plot grammar capitalized
on those (trans)textual regularities that advanced thematics; Fictional Worlds
openly critiques the structuralist quest of formal regularities or the kind of
"mythocentric" emphasis that Pavel's own Poetics of Plot illustrated in part.
The main polemical task in Fictional Worlds is to raise the "moratorium on
representational topics" implemented by formalist poetics.
But upon closer examination, the two books prove to be part of the same
theoretical continuum. In The Poetics of Plot, Pavel opened the field of poetics
to semantic concerns, examining the ontological and epistemic assumptions
underlying plots in Renaissance dramas. His prime operational concept (that
of move), inscribed Pavel's plot grammar in the praxical field where lingulstic
regularities obtain in a complex interplay between social practices and individualized tactical decisions. Fictional Worlds emphasizes even further this
pragmatic aspect of fictionality, borrowing concepts from speech act theory,
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modal logic and coordination games. The resulting perspective successfully
foregrounds those aspects bracketed by structuralist poetics, but occasionally
creates unwarranted repetition, repositing "problems" already solved (see
Pavel's recourse to Kendall Walton's notion of reading as an act of "impersonation" through a "fictional ego," where current psychonarratology and
Rezeptionsasthetik have devised a more complex explanatory model of how
readers project themselves into textual worlds). In his notable effort to reorient narrative studies, Pavel is forced to overlook certain refinements in recent narratology, or to sometimes collapse structuralism and poststructuralism, reducing them to formalist "textology."
Pavel's immediate plea is for a nuanced integrationist approach to the
question of fictional discourse and its boundaries. Taking issue with both the
formalist and the Russellian versions of segregationism, that doggedly dissociate "actual worlds" from "fictional" texts, Pavel attempts "to show that fictional texts employ the same referential and modal mechanisms as nonfictional uses of language, and that the logic of such texts is better understood
when considered in relation to other cultural phenomena, in particular myths

and religious beliefs" (p. 136). This thesis is backed up-and contradicted
partly-by the claim that fictional discourse is best served by a kind of flexible, internal approach, that will make "the distinction between fictional and
nonfictional lose some of its bluntness" (p. 53).
In chapters 2 ("Fictional Beings"), 3 ("Salient Worlds") and 4 ("Border,
Distance, Size, Incompleteness"), Pavel argues this point from various angles,

convinced that rigid borderlines are not only counter-intuitive, but also historically limited to our post-mythic, rationalistic period that sets fictions in
opposition to reality "sub speciae veritatas." Pavel prefel;s a more archaic ontological model to this modern partitioning, one that postulates fluid boundaries between the sacred (symbolical), and the actual and the fictional. He calls
this model a "salient universe" and ascribes to it a dual, structure, with the
"secondary" domain of the "make-believe world" standing for ("corresponding" to ) the "primary" domain of the actual world.
As upon other occasions, Pavel is first to point out the problematic areas in
his composite model, derived from the possible world theories and their applications to the domain of fictionality. To begin with, the world of fiction may
appear in this perspective as a weaker and degraded form of dual structure: it
reverses the magico-mythic model which located the sacred space over and
around the "actual," by subordinating fictionality to actuality. Fiction seems
to lack that energy which, in the case of mythic rites, "may leave the fictional
mode and cross the threshold of actuality," turning mimesis (mimicry) into
"reality" (p. 60). And yet, a quick examination of Don Quixote leads Pavel to
conclude that fiction may engage a much richer salient structure, with two
concepts of "actuality" competing and no frame of reference finally prevailing. What Pavel is less willing to concede, is that the "actual" and "fictional"
may converge in a more essential way, both being narrative and ideological
constructs; or that the fictional domain may strongly impact the "actual," displacing or reversing the dual structure.
Another problematic aspect involves the notion of "correspondence." After
amending Plantinga's concept of strict correspondence between book and
world, Pavel still defines reading as an allegorical operation that "relate/sl
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each object in the story to some object in our world, by virtue of the relations
of correspondence, whose role is to ensure the correct grasping of the structure of the secondary ontology as both different from and based upon the
primary ontology" (p. 59). Here and elsewhere, Pavel grounds reading in a
process of inference, without further inquiry into the difficulties a reader may
encounter in "maximalizing" textual intentions and construing" fictional
worlds. He also ascribes a curious noninterventionist status to reading, or locates "the fictional exchange within the secure precincts of the imaginary
worlds," with author and reader impersonating roles therein.
This model of reading may suit some of Pavel's literary preferences: medieval allegories, Renaissance dramas, realistic literature with its "remarkably
courageous project" of bridging the gaps between actual and fictional worlds
(p. 73). And yet Pavel cannot ignore those "puzzling" fictions that debilitate
inference or "lay bare" the contradictions of fiction (and of "actuality," he
might have added). Fictional worlds are best described as heterogeneous,
mixed systems that "resemble the worlds of. . premodern, uneducated
common sensei worlds where a highly structured central area is surrounded
by increasingly dark, fuzzy spaces" (p. 95). Unlike the abstract "possible
worlds" posited by analytic philosophy, fictional worlds cannot be expanded
to their utmost limits. They are not entirely inferrable from the books that
describe them. In one of the most captivating sections of the book, Professor
Pavel "recapitulates" for us a "half-forgotten legend" on the relationship between fictional worlds and texts. His imaginative narration introduces us to a
"fallen world" of texts that only fragmentarily reflect the fictional worlds outlined by the heavenly Books. In their "whimsical, inattentive and forgetful
human" way, these amalgamated fragments gradually corrupt and supersede
the "pure ontology" mapped by angelic scribes. "Heteronomy ... blurs the
purity of correspondence between the texts and compendia," or "between
worlds and heavenly books" (p. 70). It even throws some doubt on Pavel's
title concept: the "fictional world" remains at best a utopian or abstract project, always imperfectly reconstituted in the textual economy transacted by
author and reader.
Regretfully, the mythopoetic spirit infusing these pages is subdued in later
chapters of Pavel's book that try to restore substance and teleological purport
to the title concept. In equating fictional teleology with "the referential purposes of fiction," Pavel draws heavily on speech act theory and the causal
definition of names (Kripke, Kaplan, Donnellan), though again he dilutes
these theoretical positions to fit the economy of fictional worlds. The result is
an interesting critique of the problem areas in Searle's theory of assertions: its
idealized locutionary rules, strictly governed by the axioms of existence
("only what exists can be referred to"-Searle); the positing of a "well-individualized," Cartesian subject-speaker "in full control of his voice ... ;" the
marginalization of fiction as a form of "non-serious," "pretended" discourse
(pp. 20-24). Pavel would like to set more fluid boundaries between the two
discursive practices: "normal" and fictional discourse could thus be regarded
as part of the same discursive continuum. But he steers clear of a more radical critique that would compromise, in Derridean fashion, the foundations of
referentiality. He even wonders why Derrida takes issue with such a "more
open-minded and tolerant variety" of logocentrism, even though a simple
II
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observation like Searle's "It is after all an odd, peculiar and amazing fact
about human language that it allows the possibility of fiction at all" (p. 27),
could well put Pavel and the whole fiction-theory establishment out of business.

One of the test cases summoned by Pavel in support of his qualified theory
of referentiality is that of miming: not unlike Derrida in "The Double Session," he highlights the ambivalent relation between simulation and reality
in the mime's performance. But two chapters later he rediscusses miming in
stronger representational terms, pointing out how the mime's "body and
movements, as they exist in the actual world, serve as a primary universe, as
a foundation for the secondary universe in which the mime becomes the
saintly priest blessing the crowd" (p. 60). Pavel is no Derridean deconstructor: he does not deem the fictional world powerful enough to trigger an "ontolOgical crisis" in the "base" or "actual" world. But the tension (distance) between the two worlds is not overlooked; a separate chapter (4 "Borders, Distance, Size, Incompleteness") investigates the creative potential of ontological
distance and diversity.
Pavel's own book maintains an active tension between a historicist approach (that sees fictions as secondary, demythicized versions of "salient
structures") and an internal approach that emphaSizes the contribution of fictional texts to an alternative ontology. Not surprisingly for someone who has
experienced the paradox of "Central" European marginality, Pavel proposes
a map of the imaginary in which "peripheric" fictions manage to challenge
and renew the established ontological domain: '''Marginal' referential practices such as myth and fiction manifest the innovative side of referential
processes and are perceived as marginal only in contrast to some culturally
determined ossification into normality" (p. 27). Pavel's dynamics of "referential behavior includes a creative, risk-taking aspect, as well as a tendency to
settle down into conventional patterns."
Chapter 5, "Conventions," examines closer the second aspect: that of the
canonization and regularization of fictional worlds. Chapter 6, "The Economy of the Imaginary," tries to redress the balance by focusing on the creative, functional aspects of fictionality. Instead of regarding fictions as fallen
mythic worlds, "dwindling to a secondary reality," Pavel decides now to integrate them in the foreground of "ontological planning." By briefly considering Marlowe's Tamburlaine, Kafka's Cast/e, Borges's Aleph, etc., he redesigns his concept of ontological landscaping: what we see emerging now is
not a carefully trimmed Elizabethan garden, but a kind of theoretical overgrowth, a composite remodeling of the world of fictionality. While testing
such "unfriendly" texts "that introduce us to puzzling worlds, lead us to inadequate hypotheses, and encourage us to hesitate and to project a perplexed
fictional ego" (p. 93), Pavel's fictional theory is forced back into "the dark,
fuzzy areas." Fortunately Pavel's construction is sufficiently pliant and openended to withstand such confrontations with "the unusual states of affairs"
that go by the name of "fictional worlds." Pavel's book at its best purports to
do what he recommends to postmodern fictionists: "acknowledge gracefully
the difficulty in making sense of the world and still risk the invention of a
completeness-determinacy myth" (p. 112).
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Cinema I: The Movement-Image, by Gilles Deleuze. Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press. Pp. xiv

+ 242. $29.50

This intriguing but difficult book is a translation of the first volume of a
two-volume work on film by the well-known French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. A translation of the second volume is promised by the publishers, and
students of film owe them thanks for making available in English a strikingly
novel contribution to their subject.
In Cinema I, Deleuze announces his desire to break with the linguistic and
quasi-linguistic models which have so dominated film studies for twenty
years. Such a break is certainly welcome, and much that is best in the book
derives, in part, from the author's willingness to rethink radically the issue of
filmic signification. Nevertheless, it is disconcerting to discover that Deleuze
proposes to provide an alternative conception of film and its connection to
the world in terms of the metaphysics and epistemology of Henri Bergson.
This is disconcerting because the Bergsonian views which Deleuze elaborates
have been, since their first appearance, notoriously obscure and controversial. Although Deleuze devotes a fair amount of space to the expositon of
these views, it is fair to say, I think, that most of the standard, basic difficulties are left untouched.
For example, especially in Matter and Memory (Deleuze's principal source),
Bergson proposes to dissolve the metaphysical dualism of mind and body
and the epistemological dualism of idealism and realism by delineating an
ontology of the "movement-image." There has been a widespread consensus,
however, that the problematic character of these dualisms is simply inherited
by the postulated nature of the movement-image. As a first approximation, a
movement-image is the appearance of a segment of motion or change as it
potentially presents itself to intuition. Leaving aside questions about Bergson's notion of "intuition," it should be noted that these appearances are
conceived of as entities existing independently of any experience of them. Indeed, mind and matter are held to be constructions out of this category of
basic entities and the relations that hold between its members. Despite the
essentially non-subjective nature of movement-images, their empirical qualities are said to be directly present to the mind-they are the data of sensory
awareness. It is easily seen from even this meager summary that various puzzles and paradoxes threaten imminently. Is it intelligible to reify appearances
in this fashion? Can there be "images" which are both independent of and
yet immediately given to the mind? Deleuze struggles a bit with these concerns but does not succeed in easing the conceptual tensions. In the space of
two pages (pp. 59-60) he identifies movement-images with "flowing matter,"
"blocs of space-time," and "lines and figures of light." Insofar as these characterizations are clear at all, they are not equivalent to one another, and no
one of them satisfies the conditions which define the movement-image.
Beyond the difficulties concerning Bergson's philosophy, there is a global
problem about how Deleuze means to exploit this system to construct his
positive account of the cinematic image. In Chapter 2, it is asserted that the
shot is a movement-image, but since shots are not bits of flowing matter,
blocs of space-time, etc., the assertion is a gnomic one. On one reading: 1)
The film image is, most immediately, a photographic image of movement-
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images. And, on a second: 2) The movement-image, as Bergson describes it,
is an apt metaphor for the film image. Neither reading of Deleuze is obviously
to be preferred.
Interpretation 1) takes Bergson's metaphysics seriously and literally, and
Deleuze is to be understood as contending that motion-picture photography
has the capacity to extract and represent a framed set of local movement-images. 1) would therefore yield an ontology of the film image similar to Andre
Bazin's except that, for Deleuze but not Bazin, the world is constituted out of
movement-images. Interpretation 2) has the attractive feature of playing
down the book's apparent commitment to Bergson's perplexing theses, and it
proposes the working out of various possible analogies. The Bergson material
is used, for instance, to explain how the shot, like the movement-image, is
neither intrinsically subjective nor objective. It is not subjective because it
does not represent the visual experience of a disembodied camera-observer,
and it is not objective because it does not render the properties of things as
they are independently of the mode of representation. The shot, on this conception, presents the spectator with a momentary view of things-an intersubjective visual perspective. Such a view or perspective is not a slice of visual consciousness, but it is also not identical with the set of objects and
events thereby on view. Rather, it is something like an array of visual information-the information available at a designated point in space and time.
Subjectivity and objectivity apply to film images only in virtue of their complex expositional relations to the image-track which contains them. (See
pp. 71-6). Naturally, this is just one example of the sort of analogy that can
be devised and developed. Still, it is a major weakness of Deleuze's presentation that it is so difficult to discern the exegetical strategy he has in mind. I
believe that the second approach promises more in terms of plausible results,
but it is also harder to square with large segments of the text.
The persistence of Deleuze's attempt to work within a Bergsonian framework generates similar difficulties at almost every turn. Deleuze elaborates a
division of movement-images into three categories: perception-images, affection-images, and action-images. Once again, the distinction derives from
Bergson, but the nature of the derivation is confusing. For Bergson, these categories refer to stages of the sensory-motor process. The first and third refer
to perception and physical action, the second to the mediating activities of
the mind. Bergson speaks of the relevant states and processes as "images"
only because they, like everything else, are ultimately constructions out of
images. For Deleuze, on the other hand, although the basis of his categorization is fuzzy, it is reasonably plain that the categories subsume film images.
Very roughly, it seems that the perception-image is a film image which depicts a character's visual field; the affection-image (paradigmatically a closeup of the human face) presents a bodily expression of feeling, motive, or
emotion; and the action-image displays the unfolding of physical agency.
However, it also appears that these categories are meant to be, as they are in
Bergson's usage, mutually exclusive, and yet, this constraint will not be met
by the conception described above. Suppose a movie melodrama includes a
close-up of a character's hand as she convulsively reaches out and grasps a
knife. Apparently, this shot will qualify both as an action and affection-image, and, if the shot is presented in context as another character's view of the
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action, then it will be a perception-image as well. The objection may depend
upon a misunderstanding of Deleuze's intentions here, but the various accounts he offers of his favored categories are not easy to reconcile with one
another.
There are sections of Cinema I where the Bergsonian architectonic becomes
positively mystifying. In Chapter 5, for example, Deleuze claims that there
are modes of filmic representation which correspond to what he calls "liquid," "gaseous," and by implication, "solid" forms of perception. Unfortunately, I am unable to offer any account of what these forms of perception
are supposed to be, and one can only speculate as to the reasons for introducing them. It is as if Deleuze supposed that since matter arises from or
is a facet of movement-images, and cinematic images are Uextracted from"
movement-images, it follows that there should be systematic ties between
film representation and the basic forms of matter. If reasoning of this sort
were to become fashionable, we can expect to be reading the pre-Socratics as
the true pioneers of contemporary film theory.
Bergson's ouevre is not the only field which is mined for an exotic theoretical vocabulary. Cinema I is filled with a daunting range of terms from, e.g"
Piercian semiotics, physics, and mathematics. Readers will continually find
themselves stumbling over IIdemarks,li "'vectors/' "binomials," "points of accumulation," etc. and because Deleuze's employment of this vocabulary is, to
say the least, whimsical, they will be littie aided by standard scientific dictionaries. One has to question carefully whether Deleuze has evolved a fruitful new set of cinematic concepts Of, in Wittgenstein's phrase, the seeds of
the new jargon merely.
Despite the serious reservations I've expressed, there is much in this volume to value. It is a major and continuing theme of Cinema I that film has
the capacity to portray the world from a large variety of metaphysical and
epistemological perspectives. Deleuze argues, for example, that human behavior and the situations in which it occurs can be fragmented and reassem-

bled on film into patterns with distinctive philosophical import, and that the
shaping action of the world upon those patterns can be portrayed in radically
diverse modes. Perhaps the most sustained discussion of such a possibility is
found in the discussion of "naturalism" in Chapter 8, but to gain a sense of
the diverSity of possibilities Deleuze envisages here, these sections should be
read in conjunction with his analyses of Dreyer, Bresson and Eisenstein
(early and late). Unlike a lot of recent film theory, Deleuze continually returns to a wide spectrum of actual films in an attempt to show how his conceptions illuminate their significance. If Cinema I is read simply as "Deleuze's
Notes on Movies" it yields more suggestive proposals than almost any other
comparable theoretical work.
Predictably, the quality of the specific commentaries is somewhat uneven.
Thusr we are infonned that UHitchcock produces a cinema of relationr just as
English philosophy produced a philosophy of relation" (p. x). As a remark
either about Hitchcock's films or about English philosophy (F. H. Bradley?)
this is willfully arbitrary, and attributing a deltrious panpsychism to Vertov's
The Man with a Movie Camera is unfortunate Bergsonian excess. But Deleuze
has resonant suggestions to make about many of the major filmmakers, and
he is often extraordinarily incisive about fine but relatively Iittie-known films
like Nicholas Ray's Wind Across the Everglades (p. 135).
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Cinema I makes arduous claims upon its readers, and a just assessment is
not easy to reach. Such an assessment will have to deal with the issues I
have tried to sketch and with related issues I have not had the space to mention. The most distinctive feature of the book is its bold use of a large-scale
metaphysical framework to explicate the fundamental attributes of film, and
no evaluation can blink the questions raised by the problematic character of
the metaphysics and by the elusiveness of the functions it is, in the present
context, supposed to serve. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a final
judgement on these matters, it is unquestionable that Deleuze, on film, is
original, provocative, and prolifically suggestive.
The Johns Hopkins University

George Wilson

Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition by Cynthia
Chase. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pp. ix + 234.
$25.00 (hardcover).
I suppose the worst one can say about Cynthia Chase's recent collection of
essays, Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition, is
that throughout it seems deManically possessed. At times the book seems a
companion volume to the late Paul de Man's work. The vocabulary, the familiar set of problems (for instance, "the conflict between positing and figuration," p. 6), the by now no longer surprising conjunction of "rhetoric" and
the "romantic tradition" in the subtitle of her book, all testify to the pervasive influence of a mentor. Of course, to compose a volume of essays that
look occasionally as if they could have been written by Paul de Man is certainly no easy task, and I do not mean to detract from the considerable
achievement of their author by branding her as an imitator. In fact, one of
the triumphs of this book is that it manages to make frequent reference to de
Man and to contain a generous sampling of quotations from his work without seeming either slavishly imitative or parodic. In spite of the heavy indebtedness and the borrowed vocabulary ("aporia," "undecidability"), these
essays possess a great deal of vigor. For the most part, the book seems fully
alive (to use a metaphor that reverses the implications of the title), actively
and intently engaged with texts in a series of readings whose scrupulousness
and logical intensity should elicit admiration. Like de Man's work, Chase's
shows us, by contrast, how hurried and uncritical is most of what passes as
critical thinking and writing. In addition, many readers might find it reassuring that in spite of his recent passing the spirit of de Man is alive and well,
not only in the (presumably finite) number of posthumous books currently
being issued in the University of Minnesota Press's "Theory and History of
Literature" series, but also in the practice of a brilliant younger critic like
Chase.
Her voice is distinct from de Man's. At its best, it seems to me to combine
the ludic quality of a Geoffrey Hartman with the rigor or argumentative tenacity of a de Man. In addition, she is constantly attentive to the status, the
claims, the ruses, and the rhetoric of her own discourse, and in this respect
she resembles Derrida more than she does de Man.
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Unlike many critics who take as a starting point the work of de Man and
Derrida, Chase does not merely mention their arguments, or accept as established and authoritative the positions at which they have arrived. Most critics
who cite Derrida and de Man-and we are now legion, no longer an embattled minority-do so partly to avoid responsibility for working through their
positions with the scrupulousness, care, and rigor that they invariably exercise. Most contemporary criticism that is satisfied with simply making gestures toward their work, and many of the recently penned "primers" on deconstruction, give no indication why reading Derrida and de Man should or
can be exhilarating. Chase, however, like de Man, works through, in a careful and rigorous fashion, the contradictory logic that informs texts. Unlike
most criticism, which favors the shortcut, Chase seems to take delight at the
prospect of another "detour ahead/' another country road to explore in her
constantly ramifying arguments.
Occasionally she aims in her close encounters with de Man's work to move
beyond the positions last established by the master, particulary in Chapter 4,
an essay on de Man's use of prosopopoeia (and the only piece appearing in
this collection that has not previously appeared elsewhere), and in Chapter 6,
which attempts to move beyond de Man's own reading of Kleist's "On the
Marionette Theater" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism by reading that narrative
in the company of another short piece of Kleist, "Improbable Veracities." But
Chase pursues that "beyond" only in a limited sense, for she always works
in these essays within the limits of the critical vocabulary and general problematics of romantic texts identified by de Man. Many of the texts chosen for
analysis are themselves, in a sense, chosen by de Man (Rousseau, Wordsworth, Kleist), although Chase also demonstrates the continuity between the
problema tics of romantic texts and texts that seemingly lie "outside" the romantic tradition: George Eliot's Dalliel Deronda, for instance, or Freud.
The apparently necrological title refers to an episode in Book 5 of Wordsworth's The Prelude, which Chase reads in her inaugural chapter. A drowned
man's "ghastly face" rises to the surface of a lake, and Wordsworth describes
its recovery "in a bare, literal language setting it apart from the adjacent passages" (p. 14). The language in which the episode is described, no less than
the corpse that bobs to the surface of Esthwaite Lake, is "disfigured." The
apparently bare or literal language in which Wordsworth tells his tale, divested of figurative meaning as the drowned man has been divested of the
"unclaimed garments" Wordsworth sees on the opposite side of the lake, "is
revealed as effaced figure, rather than a primary, integral, proper condition of
language" (p. 22). This episode Chase takes to be exemplary of a difficulty
that informs the reading of all romantic texts: "an erosion of the distinction
between literal and figurative modes" on which the recovery of meaning and
the very possibility of reading depend (p. 14). "An exacerbated sense of the
problelll of figurative language" that Chase, like de Man, associates with the
rom<1ntic tradition leads, according to Chase, to the romantic motif or trope
of disfiguration. This motif derives from the romantics' discovery of "the impossibility, coincident with the status of language as rhetoric or figure, of fixing il figure's referential status" (p. 6), and from a subversion of intentionality
in rom<1ntic texts that blocks "the emergence of any recognizable 'face' or figure ilS the origin or form of a literary work" (p. 5). In her subsequent read-
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ings of texts by Rousseau, Wordsworth, Baudelaire, Hegel, and Keats, Chase
locates similar moments in which the logic of figure is disrupted.
The second part of the book, devoted to readings of narrative texts by
Kleist, George Eliot, Freud, and Baudelaire/Rousseau, develops the notion of
what Chase terms "the double reading of narrative." A narrative text demands to be read in two contradictory ways, or according to a double lOgic.
George Eliot's Daniel Deronda, for instance, presents itself "not only as a history of the effects of causes but also as a story of 'the present causes of past
effects'" (p. 157; that last phrase appears in a letter that Deronda's friend
Hans Meyrick writes). In other words, the first (and more familiar) logic of
narrative presents events as the effects of causeSj .a second, interfering logic
shows "causes" to be brought about, in a sense, by the events it will purport
to explain, its "effects." "Causes" are necessitated by the novel's pursuit of
narrative coherence; thus, they are only apparently antecedent facts or
causes. They may as justly be termed effects of effects.
While reading Chase's deconstructions of narrative texts in the final four
chapters of her book, I found myself wishing for more direct confrontations
with the exploding discipline of narrative theory. Perhaps this confrontation
with other theoretical discourses could not take place within Chase's text because of her own theoretical disposition to distrust the status of disembodied
theory, theory that, because it is divorced from encounters with texts, is usually unaware of problems posed by its own tropes and figures. After defining
her term "disfiguration" toward the beginning of her book, Chase writes in
justification of her own method: "It is inherently misleading to discuss and
define disfiguration in this way, making abstract, ostensibly literal assertions
about effects of interference with assertion or represent~tion. It must be encountered instead by way of readings that attend to the vicissitudes of particular tropes" (p. 6).
Still, I kept wishing for a placement of these deconstructions of narrative in
the context of other critical discourses, and perhaps Chase's exceptional work
on narrative in this collection will lead in this direction. It is easy enough to
imagine Chase's response to a semiotics that is concerned with constructing a
grammar of narrative; such a grammar in the case, say, of Daniel Deronda
would be undermined by the text's opposition to its own logic. But other
questions arose as I began to pay attention to the narrative elements of
Chase's own essays. There appeared to be a greater narrative element in the
four chapters that were explicitly about narrative. They achieved some of the
fluidity of narrative that the first chapters of the book seemed so deliberately
to avoid. The first five chapters on figure and voicer in their continual hesitationsr qualificationsr involutions and self-correctionr like much deconstructive
criticism appear to be resisting the logic of narrative. How strongly anti-narrative they are may be gathered by their resistance to paraphrase (they are
like de Man's work in this respect). They seem uneasy in the knowledge that
it is not possible to write a sentence that is not itself a miniature narrative. Is
there a greater antagonism, or on the contrary a greater complicityr between
narrative and deconstructive criticism than there iSr saYr between narrative
and structuralist criticism? In other words, is deconstructive criticism itself
more narrativistic than most forms of structuralist analysis? Is temporality a
more insistent feature of deconstructive criticism than it is of structuralist
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analysis? What lies beyond the recognition of. the extent to which the exigencies of syntax and the binary, differential character of language enforce a.narrative logic? These essays seem more self-critical when they concern themselves with figure and voice (the paradigmatic axis of discourse) than when
they discuss syntax or the syntagmatic axis of discourse (causality in narrative, for example), perhaps because it is less plausible to unmask the logic of
one's own syntax than it is to deconstruct the logic of figuration informing
one's critical discourse, and still remain at a comfortable distance from silence.
The influence of deconstruction on academic criticism in this country has
been so widespread that it has all too quickly lost much of its alternative status. Consequently, an important collection of essays like this one is in danger
of not receiving the attention it fully merits. Like the essays of de Man however, these deserve to be closely read and reread and they will not soon be
superseded. They also demonstrate, at a time when the marketplace is being
inundated with pallid works about deconstruction, that deconstructive criticism, when practiced as skillfully as it is here, remains exhilarating.
f
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The Tain Of The MirraI': Derrida And The Philosophy Of Ref/ection, by Rodolphe Gaschi'. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986.
Pp. x + 348.
Gasche has tried in this ambitious and rich book to present Derridean deconstruction as a coherent system that exceeds philosophy precisely by being
so philosophically rigorous that it ends by encompassing philosophy. Now,
as soon as that is said it needs to be seriously qualified, since the notion of
"encompassing" philosophy could easily be conceived as the most traditional
of philosophical projects. Philosophy in its most ambitious forms has always
sought the deepest ground, the most universal conditions of possibility, etc.
Gasche understands that it is therefore necessary to qualify the deconstructive picture of the "conditions of possibility" of philosophy in such a way as
to show that this picture is not just a new, deeper foundation but that it in
fact renders impossible the foundationality of any foundation. The distinctive
value of GaschO's book is the scrupulosity with which he details the way in
which deconstruction at once "grounds" philosophy and shows that the concept of a ground is untenable. Gasche limits himself to the arena of postKantian philosophy from Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger (certainly more than enough for anyone book to attempt), and within
these limits he succeeds to an impressive degree in demonstrating the precision of Derrida's analyses and the philosophical pertinence of his project.
At the sam~ time, and as if to act out the Derridean scenario so well described by Gasche himself, according to which the condition of a thing's possibility is at the same time and for the same reason its condition of impossibility, Gasche's account is as profoundly misleading as it is insightful. Gasche
must show the philosophical pertinence of Derrida's work in a philosophi-
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cally disciplined way, so as to show that the teeth of Derrida's concepts do in
fact engage with the cogwheels of philosophical conceptuality, and don't just
spin idly somewhere off on a "literary" side-street. But to the precise degree
that he succeeds in proving this engagement on the basis of philosophically
respectable arguments, Gasche reduces the radicality and force of Derrida's
work. Derrida's more "literary" interpreters (as well as Richard Rarty), of
course, have fallen afoul of the converse of this dilemma: they have emphasized the radical character of deconstruction at the cost of making it seem
largely irrelevant to philosophy (at least as philosophy is conceived by many
of those who actually practice it).
The juxtapositon of these two alternatives suggests that neither a simply
pholosophical nor a simply literary approach can do justice to Derrida' 5 overall strategy. Gasche soundly reprimands the literary critics for not having understood deconstruction philosophically, and the chapters in which he does
so (Ten and Eleven) are essential reading for all students of deconstruction;
but by distancing himself so thoroughly from the literary problematic of the
text, he deprives himself of any way out of the dilemma I have described. Interestingly, as we shall see, the door which Derrida opens between philosophical and literary textuality Gasche leaves closed because of a strictly philosophical mistake in his reading of Husserl.
The thesis of Gasche's book is that the system of Derridean deconstruction
is organized around a set of what Gasche, picking up hints from Derrida,
calls "infrastructures." These infrastructures are what is named by the familiar Derridean terms "differance," "iterability," "supplementarity," and so on.
In what is perhaps the most valuable chapter of the book, Chapter Nine, "A
System Beyond Being," Gasche discusses each of the major infrastructures in
turn and then shows how the "general system" of the "chain" of infrastructures can be formulated in terms of a "general theory of doubling:"
... if one considers that iterability, for instance, as a necessary possibility constitutive of idealities, "produces" as much as it "presupposes"
alterity; and that the necessary possibilities of supplementarity, differanee, and arche-traee broach the identity of a full instant, entity, or
moment by establishing an other, a double opposite to them, then duplicity must appear to be a major feature of all infrastructures. (p. 255)
We need to see the generality of the principle of doubling because it is the
principle that strikes at the root-thought of metaphysics in all its forms, the
thought of that which is as the thought of something simple and self-present.
For Derrida, doubling is not something that subsequently befalls a moment
of original simplicity, but that belongs to it originarily. This originary doubling is anterior to any dialectical exteriorization, and on Derrida's analysis,
the other of the selfsame is not dialectically reappropriable (p. 228).
So far so good. Gasche is not the first to emphasize these points, but his
exposition untangles and systematizes them with a care I have not seen elsewhere. However, at this point a certain ambiguity or vagueness begins to
creep into Gasche's exposition, an ambiguity or vagueness which is symptomatic of the way in which Gasche's whole reading of Derrida is a misreading.
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The problem is most visible in relation to Gasche's remarks on Husser!'
The problem of appearing and appearance in Husserlian phenomenology is a
notorious thicket, and Derrida himself has gone out of his way on more than
one occasion to pay tribute to the complex articulation of Husserl's analysis.
But at this crucial point in his exposition, where Gasche is explicating the
most general pertinence of the principle of doubling to classical concepts of
entity and its appearing he glides past the Husserlian problematic of the appearing of the phenomenon with a few sentences, and those rather puzzling.
The whole Husserlian problematic is reduced to the idea that phenomena
have "the quality of appearing as themselves to themselves" (p. 229). Here
now is the sentence in which Gasche sums up and draws his deconstructive
conclusion:
Derrida argues, however, that this difference [between appearing and
appearance] is preceded by the originary duplication of which it is but
a trace, since the movement of the self-presentation of the phenomenon in pure appearing, in presenting itself as such to an intuitive consciousness, already presupposes a movement of doubling without
which the appearing could not relate to itself (pp. 229-30).
Gaschi' here gestures at the Husserlian problematic of the presentation of
phenomena for a consciousness, hut he curiously undercuts this schema, apparently under the influence of Hegel, by referring to the phenomenon in
terms of self-relation. And this enables him, then, to claim that Derrida deconstructs the Husserlian schema by simply pointing to this self-relation of
the phenomenon which precedes its presentation to a consciousness: "In
other words, in order to present itself as such, the phenomenon must already
have divided itself" (p. 230).
This account subtly misstates the articulation of Husserl's schema and does
so in a way that makes possible a telling avoidance of what Derrida himself
emphasizes in his intervention into this schema. Gasche obscures the strictly
phenomenological character of appearing by speaking of a self-relation of the
phenomenon prior to its appearing. But if Husserlian ideal objectivities (what
Gasche calls "phenomena") are, as Derrida argues, split in their essence, it is
not because they must appear "to themselves" but because they must be capable of appearing for consciousness, of being "repeated" indefinitely many
times in any number of acts of consciousness by any number of rational subjects. (That there is genuine confusion in Gasche's account of Hussed here is
suggested by his earlier remark that Husserl assumed a reell connection between reflection and its objects (p. 20). Nothing could be more contrary to
the spirit of phenomenology, from the time of the "Prolegomena to Pure
Logic" onward, than such a connection, which would be merely psychologically real rather than ideally valid.)
The fact that Gaschi' does not clearly articulate this relation of ideality to
transcendental subjectivity in phenomenology is symptomatic of the basic
problem with his whole account, which is that he does not make it clear that
deconstruction does not apply to beings and to Being but to the constitution
of "beings" and "Being" in philosophical texts. This is the meaning of Derrida's "reduction of the reduction," which he describes in his Introduction to
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Husserl's Origin of Geometry as "attentiveness to the 'fact' of language in
which a juridical thought lets itself be transcribed, in which juridicalness
would like to be transparent" (p. 70 n.). Gascho is, we could say, transfixed
by the "juridicalness" of Derrida's thought and fails to pay the necessary attention to its textuality.
Gasche is correct when he argues in Chapter Ten that "writing" and "text"
have a strict sense in Derrida's philosophical work that cannot be reduced to
"literariness" in the ordinary sense, but he is wrong to drive such a deep
wedge between the "quasitranscendental" (as he usefully terms it) sense of
writing and its contemporary literary sense.
Husserl's phenomenology is the essential midway point between the classical philosophical analysis of entity and the deconstructive analysis of the
textuality of philosophical analysis because in "reducing" the entity to its
phenomenological manifestation Husserl implicitly "textualized" it, as Derrida has shown (in Speech and Phenomena and the essay "Form and Meaning"). The structure of ideality in Husserl turns out, on Derrida's view, to be
the structure of signification; and this is how the problematic of language and
textuality forces its way into the center of the philosophy of presence. Derrida has stated the significance of the structure of the sign as forcefully as it
can be stated: the sign is "the sole 'thing' which, not being a thing, does not
fan under the question 'what is ... ' (Speech and Phenomena, p. 25). Briefly: It
is part of the "essence" of the sign that it must be repeatable, but all idealities must be repeatable as well, since this repeatability is the condition of
their objectivity (that is, their in principle availability to new acts of consciousness in which they would appear). Therefore repeatability turns out to
infect the entire field of ideality, and shows that this field is constituted by
signitive doubleness rather than by the singleness of self-identical ideality.
But the repeat-ability of the sign, though described as part of the "essence"
of the sign, is not a self-relation; rather, it belongs to the sign because the essence of the sign is constituted by its relation to a consciousness for which it
would appear. Gasche closes off the opening of this problematic at the crucial
moment, without even mentioning the question of the sign, and when he
comes around to speak of writing and text it will only be in the transparent
and juridical form of the "quasitranscendentals."
Let it be said once more that Gasche takes the most meticulous care imaginable to characterize the quasitranscendentals in a way that rigorously maintains their distinctness from any strictly metaphysical construct. Yet Gasche
in doing this never lifts his eyes from the conceptual interior of the structure
Derrida constructs.
Now, it is true that Derrida himself has on a number of occasions made
declarations that appear to show that he thinks of "differance" and his other
inventions as "infrastructures" that are more powerful and more encompassing than the structures of philosophy, and that they "constitute" these structures or are "conditions of possibility" that underlie them, and not only has
he made such declarations, but much of his writing has sought to make good
on them.
This gesture must, however, be understood rhetorically or performatively,
that is, as a situated utterance, with a certain local context and another, larger
context; or say, in reference to its stagillg. In this phase of his work, Derrida is
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making war against philosophy, and more to the point, against the texts of
specific philosophers, and he plays the philosopher in so doing. I don't mean
Derrida doesn't really mean it, a view Rarty has been pushing-I mean the
phrase here with the weight that "play" has in Montaigne's "to play the
man." To my mind, Derrida plays the philosopher as well as he has ever
been played-and the great merit of Gasche's book is to show us just how he
has done it. But in heeding Derrida's agon with philosophy we run the risk of
forgetting the staging of this struggle, forgetting that philosophy is a genre of
writing and that Derrida in writing philosophy, and in obeying (up to a
point) the law of genre, is doing what any good writer must do in relation to
whatever genre he chooses to write in.
There is operative here something that we could call the fatality of writing,
a fatality some of whose aspects have been powerfully evoked by Paul de
Man in the final chapter of Allegories of Reading in terms of the heedless compulsion of what he calls the "machine" of grammar. It is absolutely indispensable to remain aware of this textual compulsion when we read Derrida's
most decisive statements of mastery over metaphysics, as in this passage
quoted by Gasche: "At the edge of Being, the medium of the hymen never
becomes a mere mediation or work of the negative; it outwits and undoes all
ontologies, all philosophemes, all manner of dialectics" (Dissemination,
p. 215; cited by Gascho, pp. 286-7). If we do not keep this in mind, we will
read Derrida in a way that makes him vulnerable to the charges brought by
Rorty that this is just more metaphysics. When Derrida reads Heidegger and
goes him one better and Gasche recounts to us how Derrida does it, we must
remember that so far we are still within the staging of philosophicallogomachaeia, and no amount of precautions of the sort Gasche takes to explain in
what way deconstruction exceeds classical metaphysics will suffice to wrench
us out of this staging. That is why Derrida speaks of "double writing", an
expression I believe Gasche completely misinterprets. Gasche takes the second "gesture" of writing to be identical with what Derrida calls the "second
phase" of deconstruction, the phase of re-inscription; in Gasche's terms, this
phase would be that of the production of the infrastructures (pp. 112-3).
But the second kind of writing of which Derrida speaks is not the production of infrastructures: the infrastructures are the "hymen" between the language of philosophy and the Nietzschean, Battaillean, Blanchotian writing,
the post-transcendental text that would flourish outside the house of Being.
And this other writing does not simply lie beyond philosophy, as what can
happen after the philosophical phase of deconstruction-so that one could
give a complete account of the philosophical pertinence of deconstruction, as
Gasche has done, without ever mentioning it or drawing on its resources; the
infrastructures join as well as separate the two writings. The second kind of
writing is the necessary supplement of philosophical deconstruction in the
fullest Derridean sense of "supplement" and as such inhabits and overflows
the interior of philosophical deconstruction.
In order to evoke the overflowing of metaphysics that Derrida's writing cnac/s, the commentary on Derrida must itself engage in a measure of enactment, a measure of overflowing.
Finally, the most striking aspect of Gasche's reading of Derrida is its style,
its tonality, which rejects ail such enactment. No other writer on deconstruc-
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tion has achieved such a colorless tone-the tone of the mouthpiece of truth.
And yet, at a time when nothing is more common than the miming of figures
of enactment by writers under the influence of Derrida, this tonality is in a
way the book's most impressive achievement. The voice in this book has
great integritYi this writer has worked hard and speaks with well-earned assurance; it is a voice that echoes with what Blanchot calls "the glorious solitude of reason."
Gasche's style is thus in its own wayan enactment, though not of a deconstructive type. In its very faithfulness to the specificity and precision of the
(trans)philosophical infrastructures within Derrida's text, Gasche's book acts
out a certain warfare on this text itself, and gains a certain victory over it.
This has been immediately noticed. In the blurb on the inner sleeve of the
dust jacket of Gascho's book, Wlad Godzich awards GaschO the palm:
"Gasche's steadiness of purpose never wavers and his clearness of mind prevails over Derrida's textual and scriptorial acrobatics."
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Literature and History: Theoretical Problems and Russian Case Studies edited by
Gary Saul Morson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. Pp. 332.
$37.50.
There seem to be three premises to this volume, a collection of essays promoting a current "return to history" by literary criticism -from textualist concerns: that the Slavicist theoretical model, long slighted, is of particular relevance to American criticism (and should even edge the French competition);
that the frontier of criticism is bound to the revived authority of history; and
that these essays represent the cutting edge of this scene. Each is problematic, and each seems questioned by the essays themselves. In the first instance, it may seem to the reader that the most formalistic or precisely ahistorical aspects of Slavic theory are drawn from-invocations of models, systems, typologies, and non-interpretive or quasi-statistical sketches. In the
second, while the "prestige" of history appears considerable, one senses a
Falstaffian opportunism in the editor's allusion to it: here "history," hyperliteral, seems without any social or critical agenda and risks becoming more
of a buzz-word than any Derrideanism it was invoked to counter. And third,
as most contributions are from more senior scholars (Fanger, Peckham, Belknap, Greene, Holquist), and two from historians proper, the promise of a
"radically revisionary" (p. 30) perspective seems at best hallucinatory. The
collection might be best regarded as reflecting a problem in the word history
as it is now used.
The pieces included do not form a unified field, of course, and I will limit
myself to discussing those that seem to demonstrate an agenda as I see it. An
exemplary reading of canonical mutations in Milton criticism by Stanley Fish
(used, one feels, as a "relativistic" straw man by the editor) and a quasi-Derridean incantation on "The Historical Unconscious" by Arkady Plotnitsky are
juxtaposed to Jakobsonian graphs, applications of Bakhtinian typologies by
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Katerina Clark, and theoretical divagations by Thomas Greene (on literary
anachronism) and Michael Holquist (on a now familiar opposition of Bakhtin
to Derrida, where the latter is to learn the way of the social text). If there is a
unifying theme it may be imposed by the editor's policing intent: "How are
we (or for that matter, should we bother) to meet the challenges of exfreme
interpr 'ive relativism?" (p. 28). In fact, when the epilogue is turned over to a
professional historian (Richard Wortman) literary theory itself abdicates and
Wortman critiques it, as outsider, precisely for not having a narrative (or evolutionary) telos. In continuing to recommend the "book" as social fact rather
than as text, it seems the reaction against textuality has resulted in a sheer
slippage, or regression.
An aspect of the presentation requires note: not only are there three subdivisions ("Literary Institutions," "Controlling the Play of Meanings," and
"Narrative and the Shape of Events"), but each is preceded and superseded
by unusually generous editorial commentary that takes a tone bordering surveillance or "controlling the play of meanings." This last theme is even endorsed biologically by Peckham's romantic behaviourism where a calcuiation
of redundancies would apparently entrap repetition ("we will be able to use
redundancies even more effectively in our ambition to establish controls over
interpretational uncertainty" [po 190]), and no idea is allowed to proceed
unexplained or unplaced by the editor. Thus a wide-ranging piece by
Thomas M. Greene on literary anachronism is praised as "unafraid to reject
current orthodoxy" (p. 268), while Fish is repeatediy rebuked for his relativist
contradictions and "'internalist' premise" (p. 126) (what demonstrates "how
to go beyond" Fish is called "immensely sensitive to the facts that institutions do not develop in isolation" yet turns out to be William Mills Todd Ill's
overarching and formalized exercise in the brave new world of the Jakobsonian sexpartite model, "Literature in Early-Nineteenth-Century Russia").
Donald Fanger explores a Ncounter-model" to the Russian writer in the asemanticist Sinhavsky that inversely confirms the misleading cliche of the always engage Russian, while Katerina Clark's appropriation of Bakhtin's
chronotope demonstrates the hazards of relfying Bakhtin's anti-tropes, here
rehabilitating socialist realism and democratizing genre: "socialist realism, lf
defined as a tradition built on a distinctive chronotope, is not dead. The
chronotope has become a national tradition and has, potentially, something
for everyone" (p. 246).
One might here recall that academic slavicists have uniquely failed to
make the great texts they preside over relevant to recent debates (no doubt a
deeply felt lack). Their attempt to captur~ a moment on center stage (or at
least more clout) in the wake of Bakhtin's popularity becomes a potential
subtext, here, and merges smoothly with the trend toward social criticism.
Thus in "The Surd Heard," Michael Holquist's opposition of Bakhtin to Derrida might appear emblematic in a double sense, conveniently involving the
codes of Russian/French as that of SocialfTextual. Yet if Holquist's reading
of Derrida is avowediy second-hand (including growls at Derrida's "epigones"), his reading of Bakhtin appears in ways already antiquated. One is
reminded that the Bakhtin the slavicists have produced as an ideolOgical bulwark against the French under the literal reading of "dialogue" may be a
weak and rather emasculated one. Holquist's Bakhtin is itself based on a
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strategy of legitimation oriented toward positing meanings, selves, hermetic
sources and (biographical) originals that have made the slavicists the less
than disinterested "priests" of Bakhtin's word. Thus the "social" of the Russian is supposed to expand and supplement pop deconstructive epithets,
while Holquist commodifies a conceit of "self" follO\ving Todorov's Buberesque misreadings of dialogue. Oddly, the social, which for Bakhtin signals a
sheer and violating exteriority, is used, here, for a strategy of interiorization.
The "self" as commodity promotes a recuperative economics consuming the
other in haphazard formulas: "In Freud, the more other, the less self; in
Bakhtin, the more other, the more self" (p. 148). Among the several contradictions of the volume~purveying old models as "revisionist," formalism as
historical, institutional statistics as the social~that of a rhetoric of interiority
wrapping itself, vine-like, about the very terms that threaten it (such as the
Bakhtinian "social") seems most emblematic.
Thus when Holquist cites Volosinov's early text on the utterance "Wel1!" ~
the model of the discourse scenario~he fails to note where its depiction of
utterance as apostrophe makes "dialogue" a theatrical pretext concealing nn
agonistic series of power plays rather than hermeneutic "immediacy" or
"shared being." Bakhtin becomes the signature of a false totalization ("an
expressive totality, if not an all-encompassing unity" [po 155]), marketable as
a compromise (he rests, we hear, "between the specter of an absolute absence. . and the dream of an absolute presence" [po 147]). Yet the moral
tone persuasively recommending "experience" over the bad infinity of textuality fails to see where just the materiality of Bakhtin's "sign" precedes and
suspends the trope of experience (as Volosinov makes clear, one reason his
signature must be rewritten as "Bakhtin"). Here "the social" and "history"
have become polemic devices, and the ever vigilant Morson rebukes Holquist
with a Johnsonian bluntness that distracts us from another conceptual void:
"the way to think socially is to think sOcially, not to think philosophically
about the need to think socially" (p. 195).
Interiorization returns in Thomas Greene's treatment of "anachronism,"
which demonstrates the price of not having a conception of figure. Greene
cites Yeats' final poem, "The Black Tower," yet \vhere the tower must be
read first as an emblem of emblematic language standard in the tradition of
Shelley and Stendhal, Greene "historically" explJ.ins the opposition of the
warriors' oath and the voice's "old bones" as "Yeats' epitaph for himself and
his few friends, skeletal relics defending withered codes of integrity in an nge
of timeservers" (p. 214). The historical interpretation here yields a non-reading more self-mirroring than the textual "narcissism" it disa\'ows ("clain'oyant toward his own outdated quixotism but harsher toward the modern age
that dismisses his rigidity" recalls Morson's praise of a Greene "una(rZlid to
reject current orthodoxy" [po 268]). Here it is the description of Proust th<1t is
telling: "A la recher-che rill temps perdu in effect dehistoricizes time by locating
its pO\\'er within the private sensibility" (p. 219). Such priI'ali:atioll appears
to reify interiorization as a humanistic icon, now privatized, \'oid of history.
Greene's final analogy seems decisive, particul,nly \\'here "anachronism"
st<1ges nothing but comedies: "To st<1ge a traged~' of Jl1<1chronism is perhaps
the most effective way of exorcising it. just as for the critic, perhaps, spe<1king
<1bl'lut (ll'solcscencc b a defense against becoming obs('I1cscent" (p. 220). The
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anachronistic model of uanachronism" becomes universaIized and effaced,
as a potential device of control, a literalized perspectivism, itself of the' "filthy
modem tide" it would defend against.
In a shift from professionalism to prophecy, Stanley Fish predicts a future
of (Miltonic) criticism as a return to typologies, the reaction to the aestheticization in the influx of minorities into the I Iprofession/' and an ethics of commitment intolerant of "disinterested inquiry." Such would be of a piece with
the odd intellectual Reaganism subtending much of the collection-neo-historicist and neo-conservative gestures confusing the pretexts of facts with
"history" and controlled explanation with engagement, views seldom unrewarded by the professional establishment. One could be excused for depicting the editor's ethos as that of a Meese Commission report on "history,"
sharing its predecessor's literalist dilemma: if the hyperreal of pornography
eludes the conceptual definition, one might say the same for "history."
While one might legitimately respond to the advances of textualist claims,
those need not include a retreat from the text to the "book," the invocation
of formalist "systems" in place of reading per se, or blind appeal to the iconic
protection of the historical or its supposed relevance. The collection reminds
us of a contradiction in the easily appropriated pass-word "history" and how
much truly aggressive labor is needed to make oneself historical. Moreover, it
allows us to look foreward to a reading of Bakhtin shorn of the priest-like
emasculations of his slavicist guardians, and where his figure of the "social"
is historically read apart from our recuperations as closer to what Jean Baudrillard terms the end of the social, at least as metaphysical reserve, and where
"dialogue" is not a flaccid Buberism or hermeneutic pretext, but what marks
an agonistic field in the absence of a trope of "communication" that is the
most reified of all. Such might seem a worthy heir of the great slavic theorists, for whom formalist concepts marked radical interventions rather than
safe redundancies.
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